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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The recent bankruptcy of large law firms has energized the debate over 
the viability of the traditional partnership model.  Dewey & LeBeouf filed for 
bankruptcy in May 2012, becoming the largest law firm bankruptcy in U.S. 
history.
1
  At its peak, Dewey employed 1,400 lawyers in several offices 
across the globe, causing some to ask whether Dewey’s collapse was an iso-
lated product of poor management or a symptom of greater systemic prob-
lems.
2
  But Dewey’s bankruptcy was not the first to result in the dissolution 
of a large firm.  The financial downturn of 2008 deeply affected the legal 
profession, and several firms went under.
3
 
Many have already questioned the traditional business structure of the 
law firm in light of these bankruptcies and the manner in which they oc-
curred.
4
  Partner defections and limited capital place criticism squarely on the 
partnership model as a major factor in these bankruptcies.
5
  Movements in 
Australia and the United Kingdom to liberalize law firm business structures 
and allow for both outside equity and multidisciplinary practices (MDPs) 
further fuel the criticism here in the United States.
6
  The American Bar Asso-
ciation (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) have long 
prohibited public ownership and MDPs in law firms over concerns that such 
arrangements would encourage violations of the professional rules.
7  
  
 * I am grateful to Christopher Bentley, James Kiner, Ralph Foote, Lauren 
Bergstrom, Jen Rutz, Janelle McCarty, and Kelsey Knutson for their exemplary re-
search assistance and challenging and invaluable comments. 
 1. Peter Lattman, Dewey & LeBoeuf Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (May 28, 2012, 10:21 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/ 
28/dewey-leboeuf-files-for-bankruptcy/. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Examples include two San Francisco firms, Thelen and Heller Ehrman, and 
Howrey out of Washington.  Id. 
 4. Michael Bobelian, Dewey’s Downfall Exposes the Demise of Partnerships, 
FORBES (June 7, 2012, 10:49 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelbobelian/ 
2012/06/07/deweys-downfall-exposes-the-demise-of-partnerships/; Report: New York 
State Bar Association: Report of the Task Force on Nonlawyer Ownership, 76 ALB. L. 
REV. 865, 947 (2012-2013). 
 5. See Lattman, supra note 1. 
 6. See infra Part IV.A. 
 7. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2012); Paul D. Paton, Multi-
disciplinary Practice Redux: Globalization, Core Values, and Reviving the MDP 
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The goal of this Article is to examine the partnership model and advo-
cate for a change in the Model Rules that would allow for public ownership 
of law firms, and to make disclosure of firm financials a mandatory require-
ment for all firms with over 100 lawyers.  Part II explores the history and 
evolution of limited liability and law firm structures in the United States.  Part 
III discusses incorporated law firms and MDPs and how they might benefit 
U.S. law firms.  Part IV looks at the developments in the United Kingdom 
and Australia and the forces of globalization that have an effect on U.S. poli-
cy choices, concluding that global competition for legal services may force 
our hand.  Part V advocates for similar changes in the U.S. public ownership 
because allowing public ownership in law firms will benefit both law firms 
and their clients and make firms more competitive globally.  This Part con-
cludes by advocating for mandatory disclosure requirements to benefit firms, 
prospective attorneys, and their clients.   
II.  THE EVOLUTION OF LIMITED LIABILITY AND LAW FIRM 
STRUCTURES 
The formation and governance of business entities is regulated by state 
law.
8
  Each state has a history of corporate and partnership regulation, and    
in recent decades new hybrid forms of business entities have evolved to fill 
the needs that corporate and partnership laws alone do not adequately       
address.
9
  Law firms have been adopting the new business models made 
available by state statutes.
10
  Most notably, law firms have begun taking   
  
Debate in America, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2193, 2193-94 (2010); John Eligon, Selling 
Pieces of Law Firms to Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2011, at B1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/29/business/selling-pieces-of-law-firms-to-
investors.html?pagewanted=all; Sara Randazzo, ABA Panel Says No to Outside Law 
Firm Ownership, AM. LAW. DAILY (Dec. 5, 2011, 7:05 PM), available at LexisNexis.  
 8. See J.W. Verret, Terrorism Finance, Business Associations, and the “Incor-
poration Transparency Act,” 70 LA. L. REV. 857, 857 (2010) (“The process by which 
these entities are created has traditionally been governed under state law.”). 
 9. See Robert A. Kessler, With Limited Liability For All: Why Not a Partner-
ship Corporation?, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 235, 252 (1967); Christel Walther, LLC and 
Lawyers: A Good Combination?, 50 LOY. L. REV. 359, 406 (2004); see also J. Wil-
liam Callison & Allan W. Vestal, “They've Created a Lamb With Mandibles of 
Death”: Secrecy, Disclosure, and Fiduciary Duties in Limited Liability Firms, 76 
IND. L.J. 271, 271-74 (2001) (discussing popular acceptance of reform efforts for 
business organizations); Thomas E. Rutledge, The Alphabet Soup of Unincorporated 
Business Law: What is Happening with LLCs, LPs, LLPs, GPs, LLLPs, & BTs and 
Dealing with RUPA, RERULPA, (RE)ULLCA, UNETA, MITA, & META, VML0202 
ALI-ABA 1 (Feb. 2006) (exploring the various disparate forms of modern business 
organization within the legal context). 
 10. See Callison & Vestal, supra note 9, at 273-74. 
2
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advantage of limited liability.
11
  While the evolution to limited liability within 
law firms has been a huge transformation, states have not yet enabled law 
firms to utilize other business forms that would allow them to have both lim-
ited liability and the ability to manage capital accounts and cash flow in a 
way that would leave firms less vulnerable to the exit of a partner or broader 
outside economic influences. 
A.  The Evolution of State Partnership Laws and Their Effect on  
Law Firm Structures 
General Partnership (GP) law was originally codified in 1914
12
 and be-
came the standard business form used by law firms.
13
  The most attractive 
characteristic of the GP is the pass-through taxation of firm income, in which 
partnership profits are not subject to an entity-level tax but rather are taxed as 
personal income only when the partners receive a profit distribution.
14
  More 
and more firms, however, have foregone the traditional GP form to instead 
partake in attractive limited liability entities such as limited liability compa-
nies (LLC) and limited liability partnerships (LLP).
15
  Whereas in a GP each 
partner is exposed to “unlimited[] personal[] liab[ility] for both the miscon-
duct of his or her partners, as well as any debts of the partnership to the extent 
that either exceed the assets of the partnership,”
16
 in the LLC or LLP entities 
the respective member or partner (collectively “member”) can at a minimum 
limit their personal liability to their own torts and thus remove any personal 




 11. See Carol R. Goforth, Limiting the Liability of General Partners in LLPs: An 
Analysis of Statutory Alternatives, 75 OR. L. REV. 1139, 1140-43 (1996) [hereinafter 
Goforth, Limiting the Liability] (stating that the introduction of limited liability to 
professional service providers, such as law firms, relieves partners from the burden of 
unlimited personal liability under the general partnership model).  Partners previously 
had been personally liable “for any loss or injury arising out of ‘any wrongful act or 
omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course of partnership business or with 
the authority of the co-partners.’”  Id. at 1222 n.1 (quoting Unif. P’ship Act § 13 
(1994), 6 U.L.A. 444 (1995)). 
 12. See id. at 1158. 
 13. See Martin C. McWilliams, Jr., Limited Liability Law Practice, 49 S.C. L. 
REV. 359, 361 (1998). 
 14. See 26 U.S.C. § 701 (2011). 
 15. See Joseph S. Naylor, Is the Limited Liability Partnership Now the Entity of 
Choice for Delaware Law Firms?, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 145, 148-56 (1999) (arguing 
that the Professional Corporation model is an outdated method of providing limited 
liability and associating the 1981 legislation on tax that provided partnerships with the 
same tax incentives as those available to corporations).  
 16. Id. at 147-48.  
 17. See id. at 152-53. 
3
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The LLC entity was first introduced in Wyoming in 1977.
18
  Florida was 
the only other state to enact an LLC statute until the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) explicitly acknowledged that LLCs would be recognized as partner-
ships.
19
  After the IRS made this acknowledgement, many states quickly 
jumped on the limited liability bandwagon hoping to lure new business into 
the state to take advantage of corporate tax revenues, as well as investment 
capital.
20
  By 1995, all but three states had enacted LLC statutes.
21
  One of the 
primary disadvantages of LLCs is that the formation of an LLC, depending 
on the state, essentially requires the creation of a new business entity.
22
  LLCs 
are at a disadvantage because this business form has not been fully tested in 
courts, meaning that potential complications that could arise under securities 
and tax laws have not been fully explored.
 23 
  
Although they are more recent additions in the land of hybrid business 
forms, LLPs have quickly grown in popularity, becoming more attractive to 
law firms than the LLC form.
24
  LLPs first emerged as a new business form in 
Texas in 1991 and initially limited a partner’s vicarious liability only to mal-
practice claims resulting from actions (or omissions) of other partners.
25
  The 
  
 18. See Susan Saab Fortney, Seeking Shelter in the Minefield of Unintended 
Consequences – the Traps of Limited Liability Law Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
717, 722 (1997) [hereinafter Fortney, Seeking Shelter] (noting that the new legislation 
was proposed and enacted for the purpose of allowing business entities to offer lim-
ited liability to all equity participants while avoiding double taxation). 
 19. See Carol R. Goforth, The Rise of the Limited Liability Company: Evidence 
of a Race Between the States, but Heading Where? 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1193, 1222 
n.134 (1995) [hereinafter Goforth, The Rise of the Limited Liability Company] (stating 
that Rev. Rul. 88-76 was announced following years of confusion about how LLCs 
would be treated by the IRS). 
 20. See Fortney, Seeking Shelter, supra note 18, at 722-24 (explaining that attor-
neys and accountants viewed the LLC form as the “best of both worlds” and assisted 
business groups in lobbying to their respective state legislatures, having the result that 
many states implicitly welcomed professionals to practice as LLCs by statutory grant 
that LLCs may be created for “any lawful purpose”).  
 21. See Goforth, The Rise of the Limited Liability Company, supra note 19,        
at 1250 (“As of the start of 1995, only Hawaii, Vermont and Massachusetts lacked 
LLC legislation, and bills regarding the new form of entity were pending in all     
three states.”). 
 22. See Naylor, supra note 15, at 151. 
 23. See Goforth, Limiting the Liability, supra note 11, at 1152 (stating the lack of 
clarity as to which corporate and partnership doctrines will apply to LLCs and how 
the law will treat LLCs in general).  
 24. A 1995 survey of Texas law firms shows that the LLP form had been adopt-
ed by a majority of large firms.  See Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners 
Islands unto Themselves? An Empirical Study of Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 
10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 280 (1997). 
 25. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.801 (West 2011) (originally TEX. REV 
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 15 (West Supp. 1992)); see Fortney, Seeking Shelter, 
supra note 18, at 724 (noting that while Texas led the way for LLP formation, it was 
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LLP structure appeals to professional partnerships, such as law firms, for a 
variety of reasons: (1) the firms can continue to function as they did before 
with the added benefit of limited liability as to both tort and contract claims; 
(2) unlike LLCs, the LLP form does not require partnerships to create an en-
tirely new type of business entity; and (3) the LLP form allows for the con-
tinued tradition of professionals holding themselves out as “partners” (rather 
than as “members”).
26
  Within a year of the emergence of the LLP structure, 
the IRS issued an important ruling confirming that LLPs would continue to be 
taxed as partnerships, allowing the continued use of pass-through taxation.
27
  
Within six years, LLP legislation exploded across the United States and many 
states expanded limited liability to “full shield” protection, providing for lim-
ited personal liability for both tort and contract claims.
28
  This type of full 
shield protection is necessary in large firms where not every partner can en-
sure the accountability of everyone else.
29
  This race among states to attract 
more revenue was to the benefit of business and professional firms, not nec-
essarily the clients whose ability to pursue individual partners or lawyers for 
malpractice or malfeasance was thereby diminished.
30
    
LLP formation is simple.  Most states have a filing requirement to put 
the public and the state on notice that the firm desires to conduct business 
  
not without criticisms of the new form, with labels such as “help-a-lawyer-bill” and 
concerns about the lack of a limited liability signal to third parties).  
  After partnership expert Professor Alan R. Bromberg criticized the bill, legis-
lators asked him to propose amendments. Professor Bromberg's revisions addressed 
objections to the bill by:  
(1) Extending the liability limitation to all partnerships,  
(2) Denying protection to partners for misconduct of those working under 
their supervision or direction,  
(3) Requiring annual registration with the state and inclusion of “L.L.P.” or 
“registered limited liability partnership,” in the firm name, and  
(4) Requiring liability insurance in an arbitrary and admittedly often inade-
quate amount of $100,000.  
See id. at 725 (footnotes omitted). 
 26. Fortney, Seeking Shelter, supra note 18, at 725-26; see Naylor, supra note 
15, at 155. 
 27. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-29-016 (July 17, 1992) (“[The] L.L.P. will be classi-
fied as a partnership for federal tax purposes.”). 
 28. See, e.g., BUS. ORGS. § 152.801(a) (“[A] partner is not personally liable to 
any person, including a partner, directly or indirectly, by contribution, indemnity, or 
otherwise, for any obligation of the partnership incurred while the partnership is a 
limited liability partnership.”).  Subsection (a) does not, however, affect “the liability 
of a partner, if any, imposed by law or contract independently of the partner's status as 
a partner.”  Id. § 152.801(d)(2). 
 29. See Goforth, Limiting the Liability, supra note 11, at 1159; see also Milton 
C. Regan, Jr., Lawyers, Symbols, and Money: Outside Investment in Law Firms, 27 
PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 407, 423 (2008). 
 30. See Goforth, The Rise of the Limited Liability Company, supra note 19,        
at 1288.  
5
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under the shield of limited liability.
31
  The extent of protection from liabilities 
varies greatly between jurisdictions.
32
  In general, an LLP partner has partial-
ly limited liability for the negligence, wrongful acts, and other misconduct of 
other partners.
33
  In an increasing number of jurisdictions, partners have no 
personal liability for any partnership debt (unless sophisticated creditors con-
tract around it, of course).
34
 
Since LLPs are an extension of GPs, they are still based upon the classic 
structure wherein the partners are co-owners of the firm, sharing in the firm’s 
profits, losses and risks.
35
  Additionally, LLP partners may participate           
in management while maintaining their limited-liability shield.
36
  LLPs are 
also financed through capital contributions from the partners, just like in     
the traditional GP.
37
  These contributions are put into capital accounts and 
historically have made up a large percentage of a firm’s assets.
38
  Despite the 
fact that individual partners’ liability is limited, the LLP is still fully liable for 
any claims against the entity; as a result, all the partnership assets – such      
  
 31. See Goforth, Limiting the Liability, supra note 11, at 1145.  
 32. Id. at 1147. 
 33. Id. at 1148.  Some states impose liability on partners if the wrongdoer was 
under the partner’s direct supervision and control.  James D. Cox & Thomas L. Ha-
zen, 1 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 1:7 (3d ed. 2010).   
 34. Cox & Hazen, supra note 33, at § 1:7 (“The most recent version of the Re-
vised Uniform Partnership Act . . . provide[s] for the same type of limited liability 
that exists with corporations—the partners are not liable for either the tort or contract 
obligations of the partnership or of the other partners.  Since a full liability shield can 
be achieved through a limited liability company, it makes little if any sense to deny 
this option to limited liability partnerships.  It follows that an increasing number of 
states have adopted the full liability shield for limited liability partnerships.”). 
 35. See Unif. P’ship Act § 6(1) (1914), 6 U.L.A. 256 (1995); Unif. P’ship Act § 
101(6) (1997), 6 U.L.A. 27 (Supp. 1998). 
 36. Kristin Balding Gutting, Keeping Pace with the Times: Exploring the Mean-
ing of Limited Partner for Purposes of the Internal Revenue Code, 60 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 89, 116 (2011). 
 37. See Kelly L. Jones, Law Firms as Limited Liability Partnerships: Determin-
ing the Scope of the Liability Shield: A Shield of Steel or Silk?, 7 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 21, 
29 (2005) (noting that although generally capital contribution is in the form of direct 
financial infusion from the partners, more often firms are leveraging debt obtained 
from banks); Erin J. Cox, An Economic Crisis Is a Terrible Thing to Waste: Reform-
ing the Business of Law for a Sustainable and Competitive Future, 57 UCLA L. REV. 
511, 518 (2009) (“Law firms became increasingly dependent on bank financing for 
working capital.”); c.f. Tina Williams, Partnerships: Prudent Lenders, LEGAL WEEK 
(Aug. 4, 2009, 9:28 AM), http://www.legalweek.com/legal-week/analysis/1496256/ 
partnerships-prudent-lenders (noting that firms’ reliance on bank financing contribut-
ed to lax management of finances, including debt collection from clients). 
 38. See Jones, supra note 37, at 29. 
6
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B.  Law Firm Capital Accounts and the Struggle for 
 Viability Through a Partnership 
Law firm capital accounts hold the firm’s working capital.
40
  An increas-
ing number of firms have attempted to maximize earnings per partner (the 
frequently-used metric for law firm profitability) by limiting the number of 
equity partners in the firm.
41
  This has created a two-tiered system of “part-
ner” titles in the firm: the first-tier “rainmakers,” who are the highly-coveted 
equity partners who bring in and maintain clients,
42
 and the second-tier non-
equity partners.  If, or when, the rainmakers leave, they can take their clients 
with them, and – even more perilous to the company – withdraw their capital 
contributions.
43
  Such an exodus of capital and the partner’s associated cash 
flow, as well as the related problem of the firm sometimes replacing that 
missing capital by excessive leveraging, has resulted in an astounding number 




 39. Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board?: A 
Proposal for Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 28 (1998). 
 40. See, e.g., Unif. P’ship Act §18 (1914), Unif. P’ship Act § 401(a) (1997) (re-
maining the same in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act).  
 41. See Cox, supra note 37, at 519 (“Many firms have established a second class 
of nonequity partners who are paid a salary instead of sharing in the firm’s profits in 
order to increase the appearance of high profitability.”).  
 42. See id.  It is imperative to keep these partners happy and to distribute a satis-
factory amount of profits, sometimes leaving little left in reserve for the firm.  Id.  The 
ever-imminent threat is ABA Model Rule 5.6 (prohibiting enforcement of noncom-
pete agreements of lawyers), making it so these partners can leave whenever they 
want, and bring their clientele with them.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
5.6(a) (2012). 
 43. The most common triggering events of law firm collapse include: (1) rapid 
overexpansion; (2) unexpected loss of significant partners to other firms; (3) break-
down in merger process of financially-distressed firm; or (4) impending expiration or 
renewal of law firm office lease.  Hildebrandt International, The Anatomy of Law 
Firm Failures, J. LAW SOC. SCOT. (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.journalonline. 
co.uk/Magazine/53-12/1005996.aspx#.Ubf8XJxrp2F. 
 44. See Cox, supra note 37, at 522 (discussing the Hildebrant International   
study on the causes behind the recent law firm collapses, noting that financial     
health was a primary factor); see also Melissa Hogan, Skinny Dipping: The Anatomy 
of Law Firm Demise, ED WESEMANN (Jan. 28, 2010), http://edwesemann.com/articles/ 
general/2010/01/28/skinny-dipping-the-anatomy-of-law-firm-demise/ (putting signifi-
cant emphasis on partner defections, the effect that has on finances of the firm,       
and the lack of a contingency plan to circumvent major structural issues in the event 
of such defection). 
7
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C.  LLP Statutes Have Provided Law Firms with the Most Beneficial 
Structure Yet, but Are Not Without Limitations and Problems 
Three main issues limit the attractiveness of LLPs: (1) the uncertainty of 
vicarious liability,
45
 (2) the lack of incentive for firms to invest in their asso-
ciates for fear that they will gain knowledge and then leave for a “better” 
job,
46
 and (3) the ethics mandate preventing non-lawyer ownership.
47
 
Over the last forty years, firms have created a myriad of hybrid struc-
tures in an effort to balance the encouragement of innovation and entrepre-
neurship with the realities of business owners’ liabilities to co-owners, em-
ployees, and third parties.  Law firms have changed with time, adapting to the 
most efficient business form currently available: the LLP.  Yet this form, like 
the forms that came before it, is not necessarily the right choice for every 
firm.  The LLP structure is still difficult for firms to utilize because of signifi-
cant differences in laws between states,
48
 wariness of court treatment of LLPs 
in litigation,
49




 45. See Robert W. Hillman, The Impact of Partnership Law on the Legal Profes-
sion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 407-08 (1998) (“[A] form of limited vicarious liabil-
ity survives even in LLPs because assets of the partnership are available to satisfy 
claims against individual partners.  When these assets are reached, the non-liable 
partners effectively have nonrecourse liability for even ‘fully shielded’ obligations.”). 
 46. See id. at 409 (“Interestingly, the sudden emergence of limited liability for 
lawyers has occurred during a time when other, unrelated forces also are working to 
reduce incentives for firms to monitor and train.  The ‘revolving door’ feature of 
many law firms, client loyalties running to the lawyer rather than the firm, clear in-
centives to hoard rather than to share clients, allocations of income based on individu-
al rather than group productivity, the proliferation of satellite offices, and relentless 
pressures to reduce the costs of providing legal services are among the factors under-
mining firm investment in establishing and maintaining monitoring and mentoring 
mechanisms.  As these trends merge with the narrowing of civil liability vicariously 
imposed, it is possible that firms will commit fewer resources to monitoring and men-
toring activities.”). 
 47. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2012). 
 48. “First Generation” statutes protect partners from malpractice claims resulting 
from a partner’s negligence or malfeasance while leaving LLP partners jointly (or 
jointly and severally) liable for other partnership liabilities, debts and obligations.  J. 
WILLIAM CALLISON AND MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, PARTNERSHIP LAW & PRACTICE § 
32:3 (2011).  “Second Generation” statutes generally state that partners bear no per-
sonal liability for any partnership obligations or liabilities arising from the malprac-
tice of a co-partner or other person not under the partner’s supervision or control.  Id.  
“Third Generation” statutes try to alleviate problems of the former version by provid-
ing that partners with “full protection” from vicarious liability.  Id. 
 49. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 50. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
8
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III.  ENTERING THE ERA OF LAW FIRM, INC. AND 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICES 
Currently, Model Rule 5.4 explicitly prohibits MDP arrangements, fee 
sharing agreements among non-lawyers, law firm leadership by non-lawyers, 
and law firm incorporation.
51
  This Rule seeks to protect the lawyer’s “pro-
fessional independent judgment,”
52
 but it does so by putting a broad prohibi-
tion on the structure of law firms, rather than on the behavior or conduct of 
lawyers.
53
  Despite this Rule, law firm structures have been creeping towards 
incorporation; firms are increasingly functioning as businesses and no longer 
fall under the “one size fits all” category that existed in the early 1900s.
54
  A 
myriad of scholars and commentators argue that Rule 5.4 is outdated.
55
  Many 
states have contemplated changes, and some have even implemented such 
changes, allowing law firms to take advantage of alternative business struc-
tures – with limitations.
56
  Providing firms with the option to incorporate or 
engage in MDPs as alternatives to the various partnership forms could enable 
  
 51. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2012); see Brian MacEwen et al., 
Law Firm, Ethics, and Equity Capital, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 61, 62-63 (2008). 
 52. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 cmt.1 (2012). 
 53. MacEwen et al., supra note 51, at 63. 
 54. See Chandler N. Hodge, Law Firms in the U.S.: To Go Public or Not to Go 
Public?, 34 U. DAYTON L. REV. 79, 79 (2008).  Compare id. at 86-87 (labeling the 
ABA’s resistance as a “ABA’s medieval guild mentality” which has created an    
inefficient cartel in the practice of law and engaged in regulatory capture of the legal 
industry which represents 2% of U.S. GDP), and MacEwen et al., supra note 51, at  
62 (“Firms have grown substantially, with many containing more than one thousand 
lawyers.”), with Adams & Matheson, supra note 39, at 23 (noting that critics       
believe that changing the law firm model will denigrate the legal profession, as the 
firm will focus on ways to enhance shareholder value at the expense of the client’s 
best interest).  
 55. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 39, at 1 (stating that this prohibition on 
investment in law firms has created an inefficient legal services market because firms 
are unable to expand, compete, and spend funds on equipment and personnel).   
 56. See Justin D. Petzold, Firm Offers: Are Publicly Traded Law Firms Abroad 
Indicative of the Future of the United States Legal Sector?, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 67, 91-
92 (2009) (noting that North Dakota allowed investment in law firms briefly, but the 
law was quickly struck down by the state supreme court); Daniel Fisher, North Caro-
lina Bill Would Let Non-Lawyers Invest in Law Firms, FORBES (Mar. 11, 2011, 8:22 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2011/03/11/north-carolina-bill-would-
let-non-lawyers-invest-in-law-firms/ (announcing that North Carolina has a bill right 
now that would allow non-lawyer investment, up to 49% non-lawyer ownership); Lise 
Bang-Jensen, New York State Bar Association Studies Law Firm Ownership by 
Nonlawyers, N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.nysba.org/CustomTem-
plates/Content.aspx?id=26964 (stating that a New York State Bar Association task 
force will study whether nonlawyers should be allowed to own equity in law firms). 
9
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outside investors to infuse much needed capital into firms without jeopardiz-
ing ethical conduct. 
A.  Implications of Incorporation and Compliance 
 with Ethical Requirements 
The Model Rules provide an explicit prohibition on law firm incorpora-
tion.
57
  Model Rule 5.4(d) states that “a lawyer shall not practice with or in 
the form of a professional corporation . . . if: (1) a nonlawyer owns any inter-
est therein . . . (2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer . . . or (3) a 
nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a 
lawyer.”
58
  However, the adoption of this Rule in whole or in part is depend-
ent upon the choice of each state’s bar association.
59
 
The ABA strives to force a dichotomy between law firms and business-
es.  It is unclear whether this dichotomy exists outside of the Model Rules.  
Many legal academics question the continued existence of this split given its 
distortion of reality and diminishing application to the functioning of many 
law firms.
60
  As law firms adopt characteristics more akin to those of corpo-
rate structures than those of traditional law firm partnerships,61 a rule on law-
yer behavior rather than law firm structure might more effectively target the 
intended protections of Rule 5.4.
62
 
1.  How Law Firms Would Function Within a Corporate Structure 
The managerial structure of corporations and LLPs differ markedly, cre-
ating tension with the ABA and the potential for abuse of independent profes-
sional judgment.  Using Delaware General Corporate Law (DGCL) statutes 
as a guide,
63
 there is sufficient flexibility in the default rules to allow a law 
  
 57. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 39, at 4. 
 58. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2012). 
 59. See generally Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional, A.B.A. CTR. 
FOR PROF. RESP., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/ 
committees_commissions/ethicsandprofessionalresponsibility.html (last visited Mar. 
25, 2012) (explaining that the model rules are offered as a guide to states in creating 
ethical standards).  Model rules are, by their name, voluntary – they are a model set 
forth by the private national association, which encourages each state’s public bar 
association to adopt similar rules.  See Al Sturgeon, The Truth Shall Set You Free: A 
Distinctively Christian Approach to Deception in the Negotiation Process, 11 PEPP. 
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 395, 395 (2011). 
 60. See MacEwen et al., supra note 51, at 77, 86 (with one author proclaiming 
that not only is the dichotomy wrong, but it is perpetuating the wrong model for     
law firms). 
 61. See id. at 62 (“law firms more closely resemble their corporate clients”). 
 62. See id. at 63. 
 63. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101 et seq. (West, Westlaw through 79 Laws 2013).  
10
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firm to add provisions within the certificate of incorporation (certificate) and 




A board of directors centrally manages corporations.
65
  Critics of       
law firm incorporation argue that, if firms were to adopt a similar manage-
ment structure, this would provide non-lawyers with control over the        
direction of the firm.
66
  However, DGCL § 141(a) gives the board of directors 
the exclusive authority to control the management of the corporation, and the 
law firm’s certificate could expressly limit shareholder power.
67
  In addition, 
a law firm’s bylaws could allow shareholders to make recommendations       
to the board.  Because state corporate law provides for the board of directors 
to make decisions on behalf of the corporation,
68
 shareholders would have   
no direct influence over the professional judgment of any individual         
lawyer-employee.   
Further, director and officer positions could be expressly limited in the 
certificate to be available only to lawyers within the firm.
69
  While sharehold-
ers would be entitled to approve the board selection, the law firm would be 
able to maintain control over corporate decisions.  The board of directors 
would function similar to the managing partners within the partnership struc-
ture.  Essentially, shareholders would have very few rights of legal ownership 
as are present in traditional shareholding, and investing in law firms would be 
a practice in caveat emptor.  Upon considering the structure of a law firm in 
corporate form, profit maximization will likely be realized by putting clients’ 
  
 64. The certificate of incorporation only requires the following: the name and 
address of the corporation, the nature of and purpose of the business, information on 
stock authorization, and the name and address of incorporators.  Id. § 102.  The by-
laws may contain any provision so long as it is consistent with the certificate.  See id. 
§ 109.  This means that the bylaws can structure a law firm to put client confidentiali-
ty in front of the duty of loyalty with regards to absolute disclosure, making it fall 
within the business judgment rule.  
 65. See id. § 141(a) (stating that business affairs of the corporation will be man-
aged by the board). 
 66. See MacEwen et al., supra note 51, at 87. 
 67. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1) (allowing the articles to include a 
provision defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the corporation, the direc-
tors, and the stockholders), Hodge, supra note 54, at 84 (noting that Slater & Gordon 
in Australia successfully achieved this through including a provision in the prospectus 
that specified that the firms priority of duty was to the courts, clients, and then to the 
shareholders). 
 68. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a). 
 69. See id. § 102(b)(1) (allowing the certificate of incorporation to include any 
provision for the management of the business and/or the conduct of the affairs of the 
corporation, and any provision creating, defining, limiting, and regulating the powers 
of the corporation, the directors, and the stockholders).  
11
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needs ahead of those of shareholders, as clients are the firm’s profit centers.
70
  
If the success of firms abroad is indicative of shareholder willingness to in-
vest,
71
 there are likely shareholders willing to invest in U.S. law firms. 
Firms could take any form within the spectrum of closely-held corpora-
tions to large publicly-traded firms.
72
  If firms chose to be publicly traded, 
they could still maintain control over the board by only issuing a minority of 
shares to outside investors.
73
  This available spectrum would enable law firms 
to adopt the business model that best suited its legal needs, allowing it to ex-
plore more cost-effective methods of providing legal services.
74
  Incorpora-
tion is a very broad concept preoccupied with achieving efficiency,
75
 but the 
corporate form could be tailored to suit the specific needs of a law firm and 
its ethical requirements.  In addition, proponents of incorporation argue that 
the Model Rules – governing the actual conduct of lawyers – serve to ade-
quately protect clients in the corporate model.
76
  
2.  Incorporation Would Provide Law Firms with a  
New Method of Generating Income 
Firms have started to push back against the broad prohibition in Rule 
5.4.  Jacoby & Meyers Law Offices, LLP challenged the constitutionality of 
Rule 5.4 of New York’s Rules of Professional Conduct, which is virtually 
identical to Model Rule 5.4, stating that the Rule is essentially unfounded and 
serves only to prevent the firm from accessing capital to continue to help 
  
 70. See Jason Krause, Selling Law on an Open Market, A.B.A. J. (July 1, 2007, 
5:52 PM CST), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/selling_law_on_an_ 
open_market/ (noting that it is counter to the firms’ interest to put anyone ahead of the 
client as clients are the lifeblood of the firm). 
 71. See Petzold, supra note 56, at 68 (pointing to Slater and Gordon’s profits 
exceeding expectations in its first year as a publicly traded firm). 
 72. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 342(a) (defining closely-held corporations as not 
exceeding thirty shareholders).  The default rule on closely-held corporations is that 
the firm is not closely held unless explicitly stated in the certificate with a heading.  
See id. § 343. 
 73. See Hodge, supra note 54, at 94. 
 74. See Nathan Koppel, Jacoby & Meyers’ Newest Fight: Helping Nonlawyers 
Own Law Firms, WALL ST. J. (May 19, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748703421204576331531008464712.html (noting the complaint 
filed on May 18, 2011 states that “the small [legal] practice does not have access to 
the capital markets that the Wall Street [law] firms have.”). 
 75. See Gillian Hadfield & Eric Talley, On Public Versus Private Provision of 
Corporate Law, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 414, 415 (2006), available at http://scholar-
ship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/496/. 
 76. See Hodge, supra note 54, at 80 (stating that proponents believe ABA rules 
on issues of conflict of interest, fraud, and malpractice adequately govern the conduct 
of lawyers). 
12
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those most in need of legal services.
77
  They further stated that the firm’s 
dedication to the highest level of independent professional judgment is not 
predicated on the firm’s source of capital, making Rule 5.4 an unnecessary 
barrier to the law firm’s growth and innovation.
78
  
Many proponents of law firm incorporation have pointed to Model Rule 
5.4 as stymieing innovation that could lead to more efficient structures.
79
  
Incorporation allows for outside investment to reach law firms, and this   
investment is clearly desired as many firms lack flexibility in funds that 
would otherwise allow them to innovate and invest capital in new recruits.
80
  
Proponents of incorporation argue that passive investment in law firms could 
actually encourage lawyer-employees to act in the best interest of the firm,
81
 
in response to critics who argue that incorporation will just financially benefit 
the lawyers.
82
  It remains unclear why opponents argue that passive          
investment would change the level of financial risk assumed by law firms.
83
  
Share prices may increase and decrease depending on the perceived value of 
the firm, but the exit of a rainmaker will not leave the firm in a desperate state 
of financial shock, as it does in the current partnership structure.  A law 
firm’s assets are the mobile individuals it employs.
84
  In theory, firm value 
would not depend only on the value of an individual rainmaker but also on 
the efficient structure of the firm.
85
  The efficiency of a law firm could im-
prove with increased investment in technology, knowledge management sys-
tems, and new lawyer training.
86
  Although the corporate form also brings 
with it the double-taxation system, the up-front investment received from 
shareholders would arguably balance this out, enabling firms to take on risky 
cases or contingency-fee cases with high pay-off potential (that they other-




 77. See Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 5, Jacoby 
& Myers, LLP v. Presiding Justices of the 1st, 2d, 3d, & 4th Dep’ts, App. Div. of the 
Supreme Court of N.Y., No. CV-11-3387 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2011), 2011 WL 
7102185; Koppel, supra note 74. 
 78. See Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 
77, at ¶ 30. 
 79. See Hodge, supra note 54, at 92-93. 
 80. See id. at 92. 
 81. See MacEwen et al., supra note 51, at 88. 
 82. See STEPHEN A. LIND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE TAXATION 133 
(Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 7th ed. 2008). 
 83. See id. at 70 (raising the question in general).  
 84. See David M. Stern, Law Firm Bankruptcies, LITIGATION, J. ABA SEC. 
LITIG., Spring 2011, at 9. 
 85. See id. 
 86. See MacEwen et al., supra note 51, at 84. 
 87. See Hodge, supra note 54, at 92. 
13
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3.  The Corporate Form Enhances Transparency Through Disclosure 
Just as firms will have a wide spectrum of available options when 
choosing a new business form, there is also a spectrum of disclosure         
requirements.  Partnerships are not required to disclose information about the 
firm, but closely-held corporations and public corporations, as issuers of  
securities, are subject to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) 
scrutiny.
88
  Therefore, the corporate form enables greater transparency 
through mandatory disclosure. 
Clients, lawyer-employees, and society can all greatly benefit from dis-
closure.  Some commentators currently argue that partnerships need to adopt 
the corporate disclosure requirements regarding the corporate governance of 
law firms.
89
  Employees would benefit from greater transparency within a law 
firm, regardless of the firm’s form, as it would allow them to have a better 
understanding of the firm’s policies prior to joining.
90
  Finally, society can 
better hold law firms and legal professionals accountable if the business deci-
sions of a law firm are transparent, reviewable, and susceptible to public scru-
tiny.
91
  Thus, disclosure would enable clients to select law firms based on 
reported earnings, charitable giving, and other factors beyond simply reputa-
tion that may influence a client’s decision to use a firm.   
The share price of a firm would also provide associates with insight into 
whether or not to stay with the firm.
92
  The LLP structure only allows lawyers 
to own a part of the firm when they “make partner,” whereas upon incorpora-
tion a firm could quickly and easily align the interests of lawyer-employees 
by issuing them shares of the corporation.
93
  Transparency within a law firm 
connects the lawyers, especially the new associates; even when the infor-
  
 88. There is no provision in RUPA that requires any form of disclosure to part-
ners, customers, or other people involved in the organization.  See generally Revised 
Uniform Partnership Act (1997). 
 89. See Rachel B. Grand, Note,“It’s Only Disclosure”: A Modest Proposal for 
Partnership Reform, 8 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB POL’Y 389, 390 (2005).  
 90. See id. at 412.  Grand argues for transparency to force firms to disclose hir-
ing criteria for new hires, id., but her idea could also serve new employees and em-
ployees currently within the firm.  
 91. See id. at 391. 
 92. See MacEwen et al., supra note 51, at 73-74; see also Grand, supra note 89, 
at 407 (stating that the SEC Rule 33-8340’s “new disclosure requirements are intend-
ed to make more transparent to security holders the operation of the boards of direc-
tors of the companies in which they invest.”). 
 93. See MacEwen et al., supra note 51, at 88 (aligning interest through the use of 
shares).  This could also incentivize the associates to stay at the firm, increasing loyal-
ty and fiduciary duties.  
14
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mation they receive is not necessarily positive, “transparency helps employ-
ees connect to the why.”
94
  
Attaching a share price to corporate law firms and increasing financial 
transparency for those outside the firm will also change the manner in which 
firms are valued.
95
  Public investors that would create the market for a law 
firm’s shares require detailed records of a company’s costs and debt levels 
that are currently unavailable for U.S. firms.
96
  And as the United States con-
fronts large-firm bankruptcies for the first time, real issues arise as to how to 
properly value firms, with damaging consequences for former partners.
97
  
Increasing transparency through disclosure will sharpen valuation methods.  
Both insiders and outsiders will have a greater sense of what a firm is worth, 
potentially reflected in a share price.  
The benefit of transparency must be balanced with the confidentiality 
required in the attorney-client relationship.
98
  There is a risk that clients may 
not feel as secure sharing sensitive information with a corporate lawyer-
employee.
99
  This concern may be exacerbated in the public corporate form.  
Not only will law firms be governed by state corporate law and state rules on 
professional conduct, but they will also be subject to SEC requirements.
100
  
The SEC requires disclosures in a Form S-3 registration statement,
101
 which 
could infringe on attorney-client privilege and confidentiality.
102
  The Securi-
ties Act of 1933
103
 requires that companies preparing to offer securities to the 
  
 94. See Quint Studer, The Case for Transparency: 10 Reasons Your Firm Should 
Keep No Secrets from Associates, 10-4 LAW OFF. MGMT. & ADMIN. REP. 1 (2010) 
(stating that high performers want disclosure and certainty, not to be left in the dark). 
 95. Chris Johnson, Value Proposition; Nonlawyer Ownership of Firms in the 
U.K. is Changing How Law Firms are Appraised, AM. LAW., May 1, 2012, at 23. 
(discussing emerging methods of law firm appraisal in the U.K.). 
 96. See id. 
 97. See Stern, supra note 84, at 8-9 (discussing the unique complexities that arise 
in law firm bankruptcies compared to industrial businesses).  In particular, the bank-
ruptcy cases of Brobeck and Heller raised questions as to the liabilities of former 
partners.  Id. at 10.  The bankruptcy trustees in Brobeck argued that for the last two 
years of the firm’s operation, it was insolvent and undercapitalized, and additionally 
argued that much of the amounts paid to partners were actually dividends, leaving the 
former partners potentially liable.  Id. at 11.  The Heller bankruptcy was also con-
fronted with the issue of whether and how to include revenue from former clients of 
defunct law firms in the valuation of a law firm.  Id. at 14. 
 98. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2012). 
 99. See MacEwen et al., supra note 51, at 71. 
 100. See Hodge, supra note 54, at 94-95. 
 101. SEC, Form S-3 Registration Statement, available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
about/forms/forms-3.pdf (last visited July 16, 2013). 
 102. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2012); Hodge, supra note 54, 
at 93. 
 103. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (2011). 
15
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public include all material information about the company in a prospectus.
104
  
Failure to include material information in the prospectus constitutes a viola-
tion of law under several provisions of U.S. law, including Rule 10b-5 prom-
ulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).
105
 
The Exchange Act, however, contains multiple exemptions to the      
registration and disclosure requirements for the issuance of securities.
106
    
The private placement exemption would, for example, eliminate any fear    
that a closely-held corporate law firm might disclose confidential client    
information.  
B.  The Use of MDPs and the Resulting  
Efficiencies from Collaboration 
Like corporate law, the rules governing lawyers are set at the state level 
and differ among states.  The ABA provides guidance to state bar             
associations by providing recommendations on how best to govern the legal 
profession and foster professional responsibility.
107
  While states are free to 
implement their own legal ethics and professional standards,
108
 many adopt 
all or a majority of the Model Rules, altering rules as they believe necessary 
to better serve society and the legal community.
109
  A few states have started 
to experiment with deviations from Model Rule 5.4, pressuring the ABA to 




This review of Model Rule 5.4 started in 2000, but the ABA has yet to 
unanimously endorse and implement any changes.
111
  The ABA has explicitly 
  
 104. See id. § 77j.  
 105. Id. § 78a et seq.; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013); Hodge, supra note 54, at 94–
95 (outlining this concern). 
 106. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (exempting private placements of securities); 17 
C.F.R. § 230.501 et seq. (providing the “Regulation D” exemptions for small offer-
ings to accredited investors).  Exemptions from periodic reporting requirements also 
exist.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78l; 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (providing minimum thresholds for 
periodic reporting under Exchange Act).  Note that these exemptions are most useful 
for closely-held corporations, since verifying the number of shareholders for a public-
ly traded company is difficult.  
 107. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preface (2012). 
 108. Chronological List of States Adopting Model Rules, A.B.A. CTR. PROF. 
RESP., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/ 
model_rules_of_professional_conduct/chrono_list_state_adopting_model_rules.html 
(last visited July 16, 2013) (providing a table of when states have adopted the ABA 
Model Rules while noting when states deviate through amendments that differ from 
the suggested Model Rules). 
 109. Id.  
 110. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 111. See Comm’n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Background Paper on Multidis-
ciplinary Practice: Issues and Development, A.B.A. CTR. PROF. RESP. (Jan. 1999), 
 
16
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stated that it does not believe there is “sufficient basis” to allow law firms to 
form corporations.
112
  In its contemplation of potential alternative business 
structures, the ABA appears to only have considered allowing non-lawyer 
partnerships with law firms, also known as MDPs.
113
  Consequently, most 
states are self-initiating studies and proposals for relaxing their professional 
ethics rules
114
 to allow MDPs, which results in divergence from the typical 
uniformity among states that generally lends credence to the Model Rules.
115
  
1.  MDPs in Practice and Model Rule 5.4 
Today, the practice of law is more integrated with non-legal professions 
than ever before.
116
  Legal advice overlaps with a variety of other profession-
al services including tax consulting, real estate, environmental law and the 




 112. News Release, ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20 (Apr. 16, 2012), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20120416_
news_release_re_nonlawyer_ownership_law_firms.authcheckdam.pdf (“Based on the 
Commission’s extensive outreach, research, consultation, and the response of the 
profession, there does not appear to be a sufficient basis for recommending a change 
to ABA policy on nonlawyer ownership of law firms.”). 
 113. See Issues Paper from ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 on Alternative 
Business Structures to ABA Entities, Courts, Bar Associations, Law Schools, and 
Individuals 17 (Apr. 5 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/abs_issues_paper.authcheckdam.pdf (“While 
there are various approaches possible, the Working Group is seeking feedback only 
with respect to the first three options enumerated below.”) (emphasis in original). 
 114. See Status of Multidisciplinary Practice Studies by State (and Some Local 
Bars), A.B.A. CTR. PROF. RESP., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_ 
responsibility/commission_multidisciplinary_practice/mdp_state_action.html (last 
visited July 16, 2013) [hereinafter Status of Multidisciplinary Practice Studies          
by State] (detailing the investigation by various states of the pros and cons of       
MDP relationships).  
 115. See id.  See generally Laurel S. Terry, The Work of the ABA Commission on 
Multidisciplinary Practice, in STEVEN J. MCGARRY & LAUREL S. TERRY, 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICES AND PARTNERSHIPS: LAWYERS, CONSULTANTS, AND 
CLIENTS 2.20 (2002), available at http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/l/s/lst3/ 
McGarry%20Mutlidisciplinary%20Ch2.PDF (examining state explorations MDP in 
response to the ABA’s decision).  
 116. See, e.g., Status of Multidisciplinary Practice Studies by State, supra note 
114 (detailing the positions of various states that are permitting MDP arrangements).  
For example, the State Bar of Arizona Task Force on the Future of the Legal Profes-
sion supported MDPs and suggests the ABA amend MRPC 5.4 and other rules, a 
California ethics board proposed revisions to the ABA, and Colorado adopted a reso-
lution to allow MDPs.  Id.  
17
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accounting and economic advice for business transactions like mergers and 
acquisitions.
117
  The ABA defines an MDP as: 
[A] partnership, professional corporation, or other association or entity 
that includes lawyers and nonlawyers and has as one, but not all, of its 
purposes the delivery of legal services to a client(s) [sic] other than the 
MDP itself or that holds itself out to the public as providing nonlegal, 
as well as legal, services.  It includes an arrangement by which a law 
firm joins with one or more other professional firms to provide ser-




Model Rule 5.4, entitled “Professional Independence of a Lawyer,” explicitly 
rejects MDPs by mandating that “[a] lawyer or law firm shall not share legal 
fees with a nonlawyer.”
119
  Rule 5.4(b) further states, “A lawyer shall not 
form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership 
consist of the practice of law.”
120
  This provision, among others, needs to be 
revised in order to meet the needs of modern business and legal practice.
121
  
Many professionals remain adamant about curtailing the development of 
MDPs in order to protect the professional independence of the lawyer, reduce 
conflicts of interests, and maintain client confidentiality and the attorney-
client privilege.
122
  Many practitioners believe that permitting MDPs will 
  
 117. See generally Bryant G. Garth & Carole Silver, The MDP Challenge in the 
Context of Globalization, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 903 (2002) (exploring the growth 
of MDPS in a global context). 
 118. ABA Comm’n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the ABA House of 
Delegates, A.B.A. CTR. PROF. RESP. (June 8, 1999), http://www.americanbar. 
org/groups/professional_responsibility/commission_multidisciplinary_practice/mdpre
commendation.html. 
 119. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a) (2012).  This rule is subject to a 
few limited exceptions including: (1) paying a lawyer’s estate after a lawyer’s death, 
(2) when a lawyer purchases the legal practice of a deceased attorney, (3) when a 
lawyer or law firm compensates employee(s), and (4) when a lawyer shares court-
awarded legal fees with a nonprofit organization which interacted with the lawyer.  Id. 
 120. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b) (2012).  
 121. John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, A Market Approach to Regulating 
the Delivery of Legal Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 
89 (2000). 
 122. See generally Kathryn Lolita Yarbrough, Comment, Multidisciplinary Prac-
tices: Are They Already Among Us?, 53 ALA. L. REV. 639, 653-58 (2002) (exploring 
opposition to MDPs in the legal profession); John Paul Lucci, Note, New York Revis-
es Ethics Rules to Permit Limited MDPs: A Critical Analysis of the New York Ap-
proach, the Future of the MDP Debate After Enron, and Recommendations for Other 
Jurisdictions, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 151, 175-77 (2003) (noting common 
arguments from MDP opponents).  For example, accountants have disclosure obliga-
tions in stark contrast to lawyers who are mandated to preserve client confidences.  Id. 
at 168. 
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compromise the legal profession’s reputation, fearing that lawyers will suc-
cumb to business pressures – perhaps even unconsciously – by settling law-
suits merely to please shareholders.
123
  Opponents feel MDPs will not be able 
to fully protect client interests as the paramount objective and fear that MDPs 
will threaten the financial structure of law firms.
124
    
Despite critics, advocates believe MDPs are inevitable and necessary to 
provide clients with the most efficient and affordable legal and non-legal 
services.
125
  MDP advocates criticize the motives of those desiring to prevent 
the MDP movement from reaching fruition by labeling their resistance as an 
attempt to preserve lawyers’ status quo.
126
  Critics of Model Rule 5.6, which 
prevents non-compete agreements among lawyers, similarly argue that the 
Model Rules are more concerned with protecting the status of law firms than 
serving public policy.
127
  For example, a California court has observed that 
blanket prohibitions, such as forbidding lawyer non-compete agreements, are 
not necessarily intended to serve client needs.
128
  Law firms can simultane-
  
 123. See Tyler Cobb, Note, Have Your Cake and Eat It Too! Appropriately Har-
nessing the Advantages of Nonlawyer Ownership, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 765, 771-74 
(2012) (describing and critiquing this argument); James R. DeBuse, Note, Opening at 
$25 1/2 Is Big Firm U.S.A.: Why America May Eventually Have a Publicly Traded 
Law Firm, and Why Law Firms Can Succeed Without Going Public, 34 J. CORP. L. 
317, 336 (2008) (arguing that ownership and interference with professional judgment 
are one in the same for law firms). 
 124. Robert A. Stein, Multidisciplinary Practices: Prohibit or Regulate?, 84 
MINN. L. REV. 1529, 1532 (2000) (explaining that many opponents think of MDPs as 
a mechanism for the Big Five accounting firms to enter the market of practicing law, 
and where nonlawyer supervisors of lawyers would disregard standards of            
professional conduct).  
 125. MDPs can provide clients with “one-stop shopping” for all of their profes-
sional needs.  See Stefan F. Tucker, Written Remarks of Stefan F. Tucker Submitted to 
the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, A.B.A. CTR. PROF. RESP. (Feb. 4, 
1999), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/commission_ 
multidisciplinary_practice/tucker1.html.  Simultaneously, MDPs will enhance afford-
ability by reducing redundant costs since services can be provided under one business 
entity, and the enhanced competition of professional services will create greater ac-
cess to legal services.  See Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of 
Legal Services, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 42-45 (2012). 
 126. See, e.g., Letter from Robert Gordon, Professor, Yale Law School, to Sher-
win P. Simmons, Chair, ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (May 21, 
1999), available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/ 
commission_multidisciplinary_practice/gordon.html (“[T]he organized bar's re-
sistance to new modes of practice, though often clothed in the high-minded rhetoric of 
protecting the ethical standards and independent judgment of the legal profession, has 
been to a considerable extent motivated by far less elevated desires to protect the 
incomes of lawyers from economic competition or their status from erosion.”).  
 127. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6 (2012). 
 128. See Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 160 (Cal. 1993) (“We seek to achieve 
a balance between the interest of clients in having the attorney of choice, and the 
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ously operate as businesses and maintain high ethical standards; preserving 
professional ethics and allowing the business of law to serve clients’ needs 
are not juxtaposed positions.  The arguments of the advocates of MDPs, as 
well as California’s authorization of lawyer non-compete agreements, 
demonstrate how the ABA can loosen restrictions while still maintaining 
control of legal ethics through more tailored regulations.  
The indistinct line between legal and non-legal services suggests that 
professionals already often overlap their services when advising clients.
129
  
The traditional role of the lawyer merely as zealous advocate is no longer the 
norm; today, lawyers need to be able to assist clients with a number of legal 
issues that overlap with issues not traditionally dealt with by a lawyer.  In 
other words, the needs of clients are not neatly compartmentalized.
130
  Addi-
tionally, rapid technological advancements and financial globalization sug-
gest that lawyers need to unite with non-legal professionals and that law firms 
need to access capital markets in order to be effective in meeting their clients’ 
needs.
131
  Proponents of the ABA endorsing new models for law firms 
acknowledge the sensible concern with ethical implications raised by the 





interest of law firms in a stable business environment.  We have recognized that re-
straint of competition among partners is permissible only to the extent it protects the 
reasonable interests of the business seeking the restraint.”).  
 129. See generally Yarbrough, supra note 122, at 658-64 (describing the move-
ment of the “Big Five” accounting firms into traditionally legal fields).  The legal 
services clients need are not isolated from the other professional services that they are 
seeking.  Cf. Stein, supra note 124, at 1534 (2000) (“Firms currently exist that spe-
cialize in mergers and acquisitions, advising corporations on a variety of issues in-
cluding legal issues, in a merger and acquisition context.  These firms include invest-
ment bankers, economists, and lawyers.  In addition, financial planners, who may not 
be lawyers, give advice, on the application of tax laws to their clients.  Human re-
source companies give advice to their clients about employment practices and the 
firing of employees.  Litigation support firms include technology experts to advise 
law firms how to manage litigation more effectively by using new technologies.”). 
 130. See Marsha M. Mansfield & Louise G. Trubek, New Roles to Solve Old 
Problems: Lawyering for Ordinary People in Today's Context, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 367, 372 (2012) (arguing that lawyers should seek “insights gleaned from other 
professions such as mental health, health care, and business, employ advanced tech-
nologies, and consider the variety of interests that affect the well-being of the clients 
beyond simply the bare legal issues.”). 
 131. Stein, supra note 124, at 1531. 
 132. See, e.g., Edward A. Adams, New Rule Authorizes Discipline of Firms; Re-
sponsibility for Supervision Imposed, 215 N.Y.L.J. 7 (June 4, 1996) (noting that in 
1996 New York became the first state in the U.S. to permit disciplining the law firm 
in addition to individual lawyers); see also John H. Matheson & Peter D. Favorite, 
Multidisciplinary Practice and the Future of the Legal Profession: Considering a 
Role for Independent Directors, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 577, 611 (2001) (proposing that 
independent legal directors can monitor MDPs and ensure ethical compliance); cf. 
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2.  The Historical Development and the Modern Application of MDPs 
Upon the inception of the Canons of Professional Ethics in 1908,        
the ABA was silent as to the treatment of MDPs.
133
  The ABA did not      
expressly forbid non-lawyer partnership arrangements in the practice of law 
until 1928, fearing that MDPs could lead to the demise of professional inde-
pendence and zealous advocacy of client interests.
134
  This Rule effectively 




The ABA has failed to demonstrate that this Rule lessens the risk of    
infringement on independent professional judgment, yet insists that it is the 
only necessary and sufficient solution to maintain the independent            
professional judgment of attorneys.
136
  However, not all jurisdictions agree.  
The District of Columbia permits partnerships and fee sharing among lawyers 
and non-lawyers as long as the entity provides solely legal services.
137
  Con-
sequently, in D.C. an accountant can assist lawyers in providing clients with 
tax advice, psychologists and social workers can assist with child custody 
hearings, and lobbyists can work with lawyers to accommodate client 
needs.
138
  The rule does not limit potential new business forms to partnerships 
as it allows firms to engage with non-lawyers in “partnerships or other forms 
of organization.”
139
  This leaves open the possibility that an MDP could also 
be a corporation, as the rule does not prohibit non-lawyer ownership or fee 
sharing.  However, it does require that all non-lawyer managers be subject to 
the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct and provides that lawyers supervising 
  
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1 cmt.2 (2012) (requiring lawyers with 
“managerial authority” to provide policies for reasonable assurance that all lawyers in 
the firm will conform to the MRPC). 
 133. See CANONS OF PROF’S ETHICS (1908). 
 134. See JOHN T. NOONAN & RICHARD W. PAINTER, PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAWYER 383, 376, 385 (Foundation Press, 1997). 
 135. Katherine L. Harrison, Multidisciplinary Practices: Changing the Global 
View of the Legal Profession, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 879, 883-84 (2000).  
 136. Id. at 891-93. 
 137. See D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2007).  All members of          
the MDP agree to ethics rules and lawyers agree to take responsibility for non-      
lawyers.  Id. 
 138. See Stein, supra note 124, at 1538; see also Mansfield & Trubek, supra note 
130, at 368 (explaining that clients are informed and consent to the integration of 
legal and non-legal services); cf. Garth & Silver, supra note 117, at 913 (“McKee 
Nelson in Washington, D.C., a firm that was organized in 1999 by two tax specialists, 
describing itself as ‘An Independent Law Firm Allied With Ernst & Young.’  As of 
January 2002, McKee Nelson had positioned itself to offer legal advice on ‘tax litiga-
tion, transactional structuring, and capital markets needs of companies doing business 
in the global economy.’”). 
 139. D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a)(4), 5.4(b), (2007). 
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non-lawyers are liable for that person’s failure to obey those rules.
140
  It ap-
pears that this rule would adequately assure compliance with the other rules 
and would not otherwise jeopardize a lawyer’s independent professional 
judgment. 
Similarly, in April 2000, after six months of investigating the             
advantages and disadvantages of altering the state’s ethics rules, a New York 
State Bar Association Special Committee recommended permitting MDPs.
141
  
In 2001, the New York Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility Disci-
plinary Rule 1-107 authorized the integration of lawyer and non-lawyer   
services by allowing lawyers and law firms to pursue contractual relation-
ships with non-legal professionals or non-legal firms, subject to certain    
conditions.
142
  Non-legal professionals had to meet certain requirements, such 
as: (1) have a minimum of a bachelor’s degree and be on a list retained by the 
New York Appellate Division, (2) be occupied in a position licensed by      
the State of New York or a federal agency, and (3) adhere to professional 
conduct that is comparable to lawyers’ ethical requirements.
143
  In addition, 
the non-legal professionals could not control the lawyer or law firm or     
share profits earned by the lawyer or law firm.
144
  However, DR 1-107 still 




Other professional groups are interested in joining law firms, whether 
through MDPs or contractual procedures, as is allowed in New York.
146
  In 
the 1990s, accounting firms advocated for MDPs, but the calamities of Enron 
and WorldCom halted MDP development in the United States.
147
  Looking 
  
 140. Id. 
 141. N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N SPECIAL COMM. ON THE LAW GOVERNING FIRM 
STRUCTURE & OPERATION, PRESERVING THE CORE VALUES OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL 
PROFESSION: THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS 1 (Apr. 2000), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/mdp1.htm.  
 142. See Roy Simon, The DR 1-107 Definition of a Non-Legal “Professional,” 
N.Y. PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY REP. 1 (Feb. 2002).  
 143. Id. at 2. 
 144. Lucci, supra note 122, at 185.  
 145. N.Y. COMP. CODES. R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 5.8 (West, Westlaw 
through 35 N.Y. Reg. (July 17, 2013)) (also known as DR 1-107).  
 146. See Lucci, supra note 122, at 162-63. 
 147. See NOONAN & PAINTER, supra note 134, at 376, 383, 385.  Accounting firm 
Arthur Anderson played the dual role of accountant and consultant, which arguably 
created improper motives and a conflict of interest.  Burnele V. Powell, The Lesson of 
Enron for the Future of MDPs: Out of the Shadows and into the Sunlight, 80 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 1291, 1296 (2002).  Many scholars emphasize the reduced ethical obligations 
of nonlawyers, fearing that MDP arrangements could hinder the legal reputation and 
independence.  See Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Transcript, Report to 
the House of Delegates (Aug. 1999), available at http://www.americanbar. 
org/groups/professional_responsibility/commission_multidisciplinary_practice/mdph
ouse.html.  But see Powell, supra, at 1296 (arguing that the Enron debacle demon-
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beyond the scope of the ABA, many foreign countries permit lawyer and non-
lawyer professional arrangements.
148
  In fact, the United States’ “Big Five” 
accounting firms have engaged in legal markets abroad.
149
  Accounting firms 
want to collaborate with law firms to enhance the services that they can offer, 
and many clients want an integrated professional service to meet their busi-
ness needs.  However, the Model Rules have halted this development.  
3.  The ABA’s Current Position on MDPs 
Though many jurisdictions have unilaterally initiated rules that would 
allow firms to adopt alternative business structures, the ABA has continued to 
stand by its prohibition even as its own investigations and committees have 
questioned the continued ban.
150
  In 1998, a commission was appointed to 
review the possibility of allowing MDPs.
151
  Ultimately, the commission re-
ported that the ABA should both allow lawyers to share fees with              
non-lawyers and authorize professional partnerships consisting of lawyer and 
non-lawyer professionals.
152
  Nonetheless, the ABA House of Delegates was 




Consequently, the evidence in favor of MDPs and the push-back the 
ABA is receiving from firms should require the ABA to continue to either 
justify its position or to “examine” the implications of MDPs on ethical com-
pliance.  The ABA will continue to examine whether the ethics rules should 
be modified to permit MDPs.  This examination will emphasize three princi-
ples: “protecting the public; preserving core professional values; and main-
taining a strong, independent, and self-regulated profession.”
154
  In August 
  
strates the need for MDPs because legal oversight helps inform clients of liability 
risks and ethical obligations).  
 148. See infra Part IV.  
 149. Adam A. Schulenburger, Note, Would You Like Fries with That? The Future 
of Multidisciplinary Practice, 87 IOWA L. REV. 327, 333 (2001); see also Garth & 
Silver, supra note 117, at 908. 
 150. Terry, supra note 115, at 2.13-2.19; see also Stein, supra note 124, at 1539-
45 (providing a detailed history of the ABA Commission and House of Delegates 
decision-making process, in which all participants had unanimously recommended 
permitting MDP arrangements subject to limitations).  
 151. See Stein, supra note 124, at 1539. 
 152. See Terry, supra note 115, at 2.14. 
 153. Id. at 2.6-2.10. 
 154. Discussion Paper from ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 on Alternative 
Law Practice Structures, (Dec. 2, 2011), available at http://www.americanbar. 
org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111202-ethics2020-discussion_ 
draft-alps.authcheckdam.pdf.  The report further summarized:  
The Commission has ruled out certain forms of nonlawyer ownership that cur-
rently exist in other countries.  In particular, the Commission rejected: (a) 
publicly traded law firms, (b) passive, outside nonlawyer investment or own-
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2012, the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, after conducting three years of 
research, decided it would revisit the issue of MDPs, including perhaps de-
veloping suggestions for modifying the current Model Rules.
155
 
IV.  GLOBALIZATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
The practice of law has not been sheltered from the forces of globaliza-
tion.  Regulators and practicing lawyers have both been forced to reconsider 
the assumptions underpinning the practice of law that have been traditionally 
defined by its domestic reach.
156
  As the U.S. debate over law firm structure 
continues, other countries like the United Kingdom and Australia have enact-
ed changes to increase the flexibility of the law firm structure and invite out-
side equity into law firms.
157
  This Part seeks to review those changes and the 
motivations that spurred them, and concludes by discussing how international 
reform and the pressures of globalization may affect the debate over law firm 
structure here in the United States. 
A.  Reform in Australia and the United Kingdom 
For many U.S. law firms, the practice of law is no longer contained 
within the country’s borders.
158
  Many U.S. firms have offices abroad,
159
   
and foreign firms have offices in the United States.
160
  Australia and the Unit-
  
ership in law firms, and (c) multidisciplinary practices (i.e., law firms that of-
fer both legal and non-legal services separately in a single entity).   
Id. at 1.   
 155. Memorandum from Jamie S. Gorelick & Michael Traynor, Co-Chairs of the 
ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 regarding the Final Revised Drafts of First Set of 
Commission Proposals, (Feb. 21, 2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20120221_ethics_20_20_circulation_ 
cover_memo_revised_august_2012_proposals_for_comment.authcheckdam.pdf  
(proposing, inter alia, “a new sentence to Comment [16] to Rule 1.6 that explicitly 
states that the disclosure of information, by itself, does not constitute a violation of 
the proposed Rule 1.6(c) if a lawyer took reasonable precautions to guard against it.”).   
 156. See infra Part IV.B. 
 157. See infra Part IV.A. 
 158. See generally Krause, supra note 70. 
 159. Anthony Davis, A New Approach to Law Firm Regulation, AM. LAW. DAILY 
(July 22, 2010), available at LexisNexis.  American firms historically dominated the 
international legal market.  Id. 
 160. See Steven Mark, Harmonization or Homogenization?: The Globalization of 
Law and Legal Ethics – An Australian Viewpoint, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1173, 
1182-83 (2001) (noting that as companies develop increasingly global interests, busi-
nesses have begun seeking law firms that understand the laws in multiple countries 
and can provide services for cross-border transactions); Carole Silver, Regulatory 
Mismatch in the International Market for Legal Services, 23 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 
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ed Kingdom in particular have modernized law firm structures within their 
jurisdictions to enable the firms to be more competitive internationally.
161
  
The motivations for reform in these two countries share similarities as well  
as differences.  Understanding the factors that led Australia and the United 
Kingdom to change the form of the law firm structure offers a glimpse       
into what pressures may lead the United States to consider and implement 
similar changes.  
Australia’s Legal Profession Act 2004 enabled law firms to adopt the 
corporate form.
162
  The change was not sudden.
163
  The state of New South 
Wales introduced limited MDPs to Australia through the Legal Profession 
Act 1987.
164
  Despite the availability of the MDP, restrictions designed to 
preserve potential ethical conflicts limited their use.
165
  Nevertheless, the use 
of MDPs motivated Australian regulators to begin thinking about the practice 
of law as a business that should be governed by competitive practices.
166
  
During the late 1990s, regulators determined that the restrictions on MDPs 
were anti-competitive; as a result, the restrictions were removed.
167
  In 2001, 
New South Wales became the first jurisdiction in the world to legalize the 
corporate structure for law firms.
168
  
A unique set of motivations led to the widespread adoption of the 2004 
Act.
169
  First, lawyers were facing increasing competition from non-lawyers 
over basic legal services.
170
  Several Australian jurisdictions allowed MDPs 
to exist, and the effect was the erosion of traditional legal services being per-
formed solely by lawyers.
171
  Second, Australian law firm partnerships did 
  
487, 527-28 (2003) (noting the practice of foreign law firms opening offices in the 
U.S began in the early 1970’s). 
 161. Davis, supra note 159.  
 162. Petzold, supra note 56, at 68-69. 
 163. Id. at 73-74. 
 164. Steven Mark & Georgina Cowdroy, Incorporated Legal Practices – A New 
Era in the Provision of Legal Services in the State of New South Wales, 22 PENN. ST. 
INT’L L. REV. 671, 673 (2004).  
 165. Id. at 673 (describing two restrictions on MDPs: (1) lawyers were required to 
maintain majority voting rights over the participating non-lawyers, and (2) lawyers 
were required to retain at least 51% of the net income). 
 166. See Mark, supra note 160, at 1194-95. 
 167. See Mark & Cowdroy, supra note 164, at 673. 
 168. See id. at 674 (chronically New South Wales’s passage of the Legal Profes-
sion Act 2000 and the Legal Profession Regulation 2001); Mark, supra note 160, at 
1195 (“[T]o date, New South Wales has been the only jurisdiction in . . . the world to 
allow legal entities – including MDPs – to incorporate as businesses.”).  
 169. Petzold, supra note 56, at 73-74.  
 170. Id. at 75. 
 171. See Mark, supra note 160, at 1198-99.  The struggle to define the scope of 
the “practice of law” led many non-lawyers to get involved in fields traditionally 
practiced by only lawyers.  Id. at 1198.  Uncompetitive law firm structure may partial-
ly explain how lawyers became effectively barred from practicing traditional lawyer 
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not enjoy the benefits of limited liability to the same extent as U.S. firms do 
today.
172
  Third, because each of Australia’s states legislates its own rules  
and regulations regarding the practice of law,
173
 a lack of uniformity limited 
the true availability of the corporate form.  In 2004, to further the goals        
of uniformity and competitiveness both domestically and internationally, the 
Law Council of Australia adopted the National Legal Professional Model 
Provisions.
174
  This set the stage for the Legal Profession Act 2004.
175
  With 
the passage of the Act, incorporated law firms no longer had to concern  
themselves with regulatory conflicts in states that would not allow a publicly 
owned law firm to enter the market.  Up until the passage of the Act,        
every corporate firm remained privately held.  Widespread adoption of       
the Act allowed Slater & Gordon, the poster child of publicly-owned law 




The United Kingdom also undertook dramatic reform of its legal system 
when it enacted the Legal Services Act 2007.
177
  Sir David Clementi prepared 
a report in 2004 on behalf of the United Kingdom government which con-
cluded that the regulations were “outdated, inflexible, over-complex, and 
insufficiently accountable or transparent.”
178
  Similar to Australia, the need 
for increased competition, efficiency, and consumer satisfaction in legal ser-
vices were the main justifications for reform.
179
  The resulting Act created – 
among other reforms – “alternative business structures,” allowing non-lawyer 
  
functions; this reason at the very least was at the heart of Australia’s reform.  Petzold, 
supra note 56, at 76.  
 172. See Petzold, supra note 56, at 77.  The consequences of such extensive liabil-
ity were that law firms had to be constantly on alert for malpractice suits, and were 
forced to develop prophylactic measures in anticipation.  Id.  Such measures included 
“running bare,” by holding small amounts of insurance and limiting the assets in the 
firm to minimize damages.  Id.  
 173. See Mark, supra note 160, at 1176. 
 174. See Petzold, supra note 56, at 74.  For comparison, the Law Council of Aus-
tralia functions much like the ABA, as a national advocacy group for lawyers, and the 
National Legal Professional Model Provisions are equally similar to the Model Rules 
advocated by the ABA.  While not authoritative, they serve to unify the professional 
rules among jurisdictions. Our Role, LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTL., http://www. lawcoun-
cil.asn.au/lawcouncil/index.php/about-the-law-council-of-australia/our-role (last visit-
ed Aug. 19, 2013). 
 175. See Petzold, supra note 56, at 74.   
 176. Richard Lloyd, British Firms are Watching Australia’s Law Firm IPOs with 
Interest, AM. LAW. DAILY (June 6, 2007), available at LexisNexis. 
 177. See Petzold, supra note 56, at 82. 
 178. DAVID CLEMENTI, REVIEW OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR LEGAL 
SERVICES IN ENGLAND AND WALES, FINAL REPORT 1 (2004) (emphasis omitted). 
 179. Petzold, supra note 56, at 82.  Consumer complaints were common, con-
sistent, and well-documented.  Id. at 86.  The thought was that the problem was not 
with individual lawyers and firms, but that the entire system was faulty.  Id. at 82. 
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investment in firms, subject to a fit to own test for shareholders seeking to 
own more than ten percent.
180
  
Chief among the reasons for reform in both Australia and the United 
Kingdom was the call for competitiveness and efficiency in the practice of 
law.
181
  Australia’s focus on competitiveness was based partly on both inter-
national and domestic pressures.
182
  Trade in transnational legal services was 
declining in the early 2000s,
183
 and lawmakers saw liberalization as a neces-
sary step for Australia to compete on a global level.
184
  The push for liberali-
zation through the elimination of anti-competitive rules also dominated dis-
cussions about the fragmented state of professional rules.
185
   
In the United Kingdom, however, the push for increasing competition 
shared only a few similarities with the Australian experience.  On one hand, 
like Australia, the increasing participation in the market for basic legal ser-
vices by non-lawyers was pervasive enough to convince regulators and practi-
tioners that change was needed.
186
  However, this problem could have been 
fixed simply by tightening the definition of what constitutes the practice of 
law and reserving more basic services for lawyers.
187
  The true source of zeal 
for competition policy in the United Kingdom began when the Labour Party 
came back into power in 1997 and began strongly pushing a free-market 
agenda.
188
  Consumer dissatisfaction with legal services prompted lawmakers 
to reevaluate the system.
189
  The Legal Services Act was the culmination of 
  
 180. See Cox, supra note 37, at 536-37 (Whether an outside investors is fit to own 
may be “conditioned on approval of the investor's “probity and financial position,” as 
determined by the licensing authority.”).   
 181. Petzold, supra note 56, at 82. 
 182. Id. at 75. 
 183. See Mark, supra note 160, at 1186-87 (“By 1997-98, exports had risen to 
$207 million and imports were eighty- three million dollars, with a surplus of $124 
million.  The latest figures, however, reveal that exports have stagnated – to around 
two hundred million dollars in the past two years – while legal service imports have 
fallen by a dramatic forty percent in 1999-2000.”).  
 184. Id. at 1187-89 (discussing reforms aimed at reducing restrictions on foreign 
lawyers). 
 185. Id. at 1189 (noting that efforts to harmonize fragmented professional rules 
among states by the Law Council of Australia, other bar associations, and regulators 
focused on the promotion of competition policy).  
 186. See Petzold, supra note 56, at 83. 
 187. See Christopher J. Whelan, The Paradox of Professionalism: Global Law 
Practice Means Business, 27 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 465, 471 (2008) (“Traditionally, 
in the U.K., there have been very few restrictions on offering legal advice and assis-
tance.  Most legal services can be offered by anyone for free or for a fee.  Some im-
portant legal services are “reserved” . . . [h]owever, the list is relatively short.”).  
 188. See Petzold, supra note 56, at 81-82. 
 189. Id. at 86. 
27
Adams: Adams: Rethinking the Law Firm
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: Adams – Final Formatting – 1/23/14 Created on:  2/17/2014 3:36:00 PM Last Printed: 2/17/2014 3:38:00 PM 
804 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78   




The pressures that prompted change in Australia and the United King-
dom do not exist to the same extent in the United States.  Differences both in 
policy preferences and the systems of regulation explain why a similar push 
to remove restrictions on law firm structure has not taken off in the United 
States.  The U.S. legal profession is self-regulated by the courts,
191
 not by 
legislation.
192
  Although some have criticized the model as a failure,
193
 the 
ABA remains committed to the justifications for self-regulation.
194
  With both 
Australia and the United Kingdom, the move to allow publicly-owned firms 
came by way of legislation.  The Legal Services Act also created the Legal 
Services Board to oversee all legal regulation
195
 due to the consumer com-
plaints that the system was not providing adequate access to justice.
196
  Addi-
tional political sources of reform in the United Kingdom and Australia stem 
from antitrust regulators and consumer advocacy groups, interests which have 
little impact on the regulation of U.S. lawyers.
197
  
The competitive pressures in the United Kingdom and Australia are also 
manifestly lacking in the United States.  The historical pressure on lawyers to 
compete with non-lawyers for legal services in these countries is a relative 
non-issue in the United States.
198
  The ABA has aggressively attempted to 
  
 190. Id. at 86-87. 
 191. See, e.g., Whelan, supra note 187, at 467.  
 192. This is not entirely true.  See Ted Schneyer, Thoughts on the Compatibility of 
Recent U.K. and Australian Reforms with U.S. Traditions in Regulating Law Practice, 
2009 J. PROF. LAW. 13, 16 (2009) (citing section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
SEC regulations as examples of “piecemeal” regulations that do not interfere or re-
place basic features of the self- regulatory system).  
 193. Fred C. Zacharias, The Future Structure and Regulation of Law Practice: 
Confronting Lies, Fictions, and False Paradigms in Legal Ethics Regulation, 44 
ARIZ. L. REV. 829, 831 (2002) (arguing that regulators rely on “idealizations about 
lawyers or the practice of law” when drafting or amending rules). 
 194. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Eco-
nomic Cost of Professional Control Over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
1689, 1697-98 (2008). 
 195. See Whelan, supra note 187, at 475-76 (“One of the most striking features   
of the reforms is the extent to which regulators are now independent of the legal  
profession.”).  
 196. See id. (noting that the board consists of lay people, and that one of its prima-
ry objectives is to ensure consumer confidence in the legal profession).  All com-
plaints about the legal profession are also now handled by an independent regulatory 
body.  Id. at 477. 
 197. See Schneyer, supra note 192, at 25 (noting further that “the ‘state action’ 
doctrine in federal antitrust law immunizes state court rules governing law practice 
and firm structure from antitrust scrutiny . . .”).  
 198. See Petzold, supra note 56, at 96-97.  Because maintaining a strict definition 
of what constitutes legal work is inherently difficult due to the natural overlap of 
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define the practice of law and persuade states to maintain and enforce laws 
that prevent non-lawyers from practicing traditionally-legal functions.
199
  The 
scheme of self-regulation, combined with the attitude that legal functions 
should be confined to legal practice, stems from the belief that the practice of 
law is a “profession” rather than merely a business.
200
  This assumption, 
while being questioned by many legal scholars in the United States, at least 
partially insulates the industry from criticisms that the rules impede pure 
competition.  This is somewhat tautological, as it is the competitive pressures 
in the United Kingdom and Australia that have eroded the conception of law 
as something other than a business.  Until the United States begins to feel that 
its law firms are threatened by inflexible business structures, the calls for 
reform will be minimal.  However, global pressures may create those threats 
and lead the United States down the path of outside equity in law firms.  
B.  Pressures of Globalization on U.S. Policy 
Differences between the American system of law and the United King-
dom and Australian systems help explain why the United States is watching 
the effects of firm-structure reform unfold overseas instead of seriously en-
gaging in reform discussions itself.  However, the forces of globalization in 
conjunction with these reforms abroad may still impact the future of U.S. 
regulatory policy.  Globalization is a tricky concept to define, and it carries 
with it several different but important meanings.
201
  Globalization is charac-
terized by the removal of barriers between countries and the increasing flow 
of goods, people, and ideas around the world.
202
  Economics, governance, and 




some legal and non-legal services, the problem exists on some level in the U.S., but 
the fear of criminal sanctions minimizes the problem.  See Charles W. Wolfram, Mul-
tidisciplinary Partnerships in the Law Practice of European and American Lawyers, 
in LAWYER’S PRACTICE AND IDEALS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW 329-31 (John J. Barcelo 
& Roger Cramton, eds., 1999). 
 199. See, e.g., Comm’n on Multidisciplinary Practice, MDP Recommendation, 
A.B.A. CTR. PROF. RESP. (July 13, 2000), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/profes-
sional_responsibility/commission_multidisciplinary_practice/mdprecom10f.html 
(noting the “lawyer’s duty to help maintain a single profession of law”). 
 200. See generally, MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT PREAMBLE AND SCOPE 
COMMENT 10, available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_respon-
sibilty/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/model_rules_of_profession
al_conduct_preamble_scope.html (noting that the practice of law is a self-govern-   
ing profession). 
 201. See Jonathan Goldsmith, The Core Values of the Legal Profession for Law-
yers Today and Tomorrow, 28 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 441, 443-44 (2008). 
 202. See id. 
 203. See id. 
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The practice of law has become increasingly global, growing exponen-
tially since the mid-1980s.
204
  This trend is exemplified by increases both in 
the trade of legal services and in the number of law firms that have estab-
lished offices worldwide.
205
  As corporations have gone transnational, the 
need for transactional services covering multiple national jurisdictions has 
increased.
206
  And as transactions become increasingly complex, spanning 
multiple countries in law and location, law firms that want to compete must 
develop an international presence.
207
 
Free market economic rationalism accompanies these trends as the dom-
inant economic theory of globalization.
208
  Firms in London now compete 
directly with firms in New York, a reality that has consequences for the con-
sideration of law firm structure.
209
  The practice of law is increasingly seen as 
the practice of business on the global level.
210
  Clients demand cost-
effectiveness, and the sheer number of firms competing for their business 
means that they will get it.  In a world where competitiveness demands effi-
ciency, the policy choices of the United Kingdom and Australia undoubtedly 
affect U.S. law firms.  
In terms of pure economic competition, there are two main ways that the 
U.S. insistence on the partnership model might disadvantage U.S. firms.  
First, the ethical justifications for banning outside capital demand a certain 
level of “quality” of representation by U.S. firms that the new liberalized 
programs do not.  In particular, prohibiting U.S. firms from offering non-legal 
services might make them less attractive to clients searching for a one-stop 
shop.  If there are ethical trade-offs with the liberalized structure, then the 
policymakers of the United Kingdom and Australia are comfortable with 
them.  In a market economy, the consumer dictates business.  If corporate 
clients are willing to accept the risk of a violation of the professional rules for 
a cheaper price tag offered by firms in Australia and the United Kingdom, 
then U.S. firms may be shut out of the market for those “lower quality” ser-
vices.
211
  For example, the increasing practice of outsourcing legal work pre-
  
 204. James R. Faulconbridge et al., Global Law Firms: Globalization and Organ-
izational Spaces of Cross-Border Legal Work, 28 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 455,        
456 (2008). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 457-58. 
 207. See Mark, supra note 160, at 1182-83. 
 208. See id. 1174-75.  
 209. See Faulconbridge et al., supra note 204, at 457-58.  
 210. See id. at 465 (noting that law firms that practice globally tend to have   
competitive advantages, such as “technology, management and marketing” over   
local firms). 
 211. See Mark Tuft, Supervising Offshore Outsourcing of Legal Services in a 
Global Environment: Re-examining Current Ethical Standards, 43 AKRON L. REV. 
825, 844 (2010) (examining the ethical difficulties presented by outsourcing legal 
work to contract lawyers or lawyers outside of the United States). 
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sents ethical dilemmas, and the Model Rules require the outsourcing lawyer 
to manage and supervise the outsourced work in order to avoid an ethics vio-
lation.
212
  The attendant ethical duties for the supervision of outsourced law-
yers require the supervisor to ensure that the outsourced lawyer is in compli-
ance with all of the ethical rules.
213
  The supervision of non-lawyers requires 
that they are not engaging in the unauthorized practice of law.
214
  Competitive 
complications may arise in the form of higher transaction costs or because 
competing codes of professional conduct have more relaxed rules regarding, 
for example, the unauthorized practice of law. 
The second potential disadvantage to U.S. firms is a capital disad-
vantage.  Large infusions of capital investments may give firms in the United 
Kingdom and Australia a head start on global expansion and encourage inno-
vation.  Some argue that law firms are not traditionally capital-intensive, and 
do not need a heavy dose of equity investment in order to expand.  However, 
that argument is only true when comparing law firms of the same structure.  
When law firms compete, the organizational structures compete as well.  Op-
portunities to take on additional risk, either in specific cases or in expansion 
decisions, demand flexibility and adaptability.
215
  There are several examples 
of these opportunities where a capital advantage could be decisive.  One is the 
potential for large-scale corporate law firm mergers.  Following liberaliza-
tion, markets tend to consolidate as a result of either mergers or rapid 
growth.
216
  Another opportunity may also allow those law firms to “invest” in 
lawyers, where London firms poach successful New York partners.
217
  
Whether these turn out to be profitable strategies remains to be seen, but it is 
at least clear that firms without these capital contributions will likely be una-
ble to compete for those opportunities.   
V.  ANALYSIS 
In 1977, prior to the enactment of the Model Rules, the ABA formed the 
Commission on the Evaluation of Professional Standards (Kutak Commis-
  
 212. See id. at 826, 844. 
 213. See id. at 829-30.  
 214. Id. at 831. 
 215. For example, a U.S. firm, bound by Model Rule 5.4, considering expansion 
in Australia will be faced with the same competitive dilemma that Australian law 
firms faced when they competed with non-lawyers for basic legal services under the 
old rules. 
 216. See STEPHEN DAVIES, THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF PARTNERSHIP 
RESTRICTIONS IN THE LEGAL SERVICES SECTOR AND THEIR POSSIBLE REMOVAL 13 
(2005), available at http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/107435/107584/da-
vies.pdf. 
 217. See Ron Zapata, U.S. Law Firm IPOs Inevitable, Legal Scholars Say, 
LAW360 (Apr. 1, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/51864/u-s-law-
firm-ipos-inevitable-legal-scholars-say. 
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sion) to examine whether the ABA should revise or replace the then-current 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility.
218
  The Kutak Commission rec-
ommended a proposed rule 5.4 that focused on lawyer conduct rather than 
law firm structure, resulting in a proposed rule that would have allowed non-
lawyer investment in and managerial control of law firms.
219
  The proposed 
rule would have also permitted law firms to incorporate and be publicly trad-
ed.
220
  Thus, the proposed rule would likely have accomplished the goals of 
allowing: (1) law firms to incorporate and access capital; (2) alternatively-
structured law firms to flourish, with lawyers having the ability to engage in 
business arrangements and fee-sharing agreements with non-lawyers; and (3) 
law firms to decide whether to go public.  Unfortunately, opponents presented 
several arguments addressing why ownership or management of law firms by 
non-lawyers was potentially harmful.
221
  These arguments resonated with the 
ABA House of Delegates, which rejected the Kutak Commission’s proposed 
rule and instead adopted the current Rule 5.4.
222
  Recognizing that “expand-
ing technology, the globalization of financial markets, and increased govern-
ment regulation had reshaped client demand for legal services,”
223
 the ABA 
formed the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice in 1998.
224
  In 2000, 
twenty-three years after the Kutak Commission’s recommendation, the 
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice acknowledged that the Model 
Rules were inappropriate in light of global developments;
225
 however, the 
recommendation was once again overshadowed by ethical concerns and the 
Rules remain unchanged thirteen years later.
226
   
Maintaining the Rules in their current form has stymied U.S. law firms 
by preventing access to much-needed infusions of capital and restricting al-
ternative firm structures that could result in increased efficiency and competi-
  
 218. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 1.12 (3d 
ed. 2009). 
 219. See Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board?: 
A Proposal for Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 8 (1998).  
See, e.g., KAN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2007); MO. RULES OF PROF'L 
CONDUCT R. 4-5.4 (2007); NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-505.4 (2008). 
 220. Adams & Matheson, supra note 219, at 9. 
 221. ABA, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982-2005, 580-81 (2006). 
 222. Matthew W. Bish, Revising Model Rule 5.4: Adopting a Regulatory Scheme 
that Permits Nonlawyer Ownership and Management of Law firms, 48 WASHBURN 
L.J. 669, 670 (2009). 
 223. Id. at 678. 
 224. Ryan S. Christensen, Roosters in the Henhouse? How Attorney-Accountant 
Partnerships Would Benefit Consumers and Corporate Clients, 37 J. CORP. L. 911, 
914 (2012). 
 225. See id. at 918. 
 226. See id. 
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tive advantages.
227
  The Rules need to be modified to allow U.S. law firms to 
effectively compete in the global legal services industry.  Such modifications 
could be paired with mandated disclosures and clauses in articles of incorpo-
ration or bylaws to prevent the concerns raised by opponents of the Kutak 
Commission’s recommendations.   
A.  The ABA Needs to Modify the Model Rules to Address the Legal 
Needs of a Changing Society 
As global society changes, so do its legal needs and, subsequently, so 
does the means by which the legal profession addresses those needs.  In 2000, 
the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice acknowledged the impact of 
forces upon society and the legal profession, and the disconnect between the 
Model Rules and our changing society.
228  
Among the needs identified were 
improved access to legal services and greater transparency of law firm man-
agement and operations.
229
  Twelve years later, the ABA continues to refrain 
from modifying Model Rules 5.1 and 5.4 to align with the realities of the 
world in which they are to operate.  To address the changing legal needs of 
society, including the aforementioned needs for access and transparency, the 
ABA needs to embrace that which scholars and commentators propose, Aus-
tralia and the United Kingdom permit, and some state legislatures have con-
templated: enabling law firms to incorporate and engage in alternative busi-
ness structures, with limitations. 
1.  Alternative Business Structures Are Mutually Beneficial to Law 
Firms and Interested Parties 
The flexibility of the alternative business structure is mutually beneficial 
to law firms and interested parties.  The alternative business structure vehicle 
provides firms with greater access to the capital markets as well as flexibility 
of funds and management structures.
230
  Increased access to capital allows 
law firms to more heavily invest in technology, knowledge management sys-
tems, and new lawyer training.
231
  Investment in these resources enables law 
firms to deliver higher-quality legal services more efficiently.  In addition, the 
  
 227. See Hodge, supra note 54, at 92-93. 
 228. See Christensen, supra note 224, at 918.  
 229. Id. (The ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice listed forces that 
have impacted society and the legal profession including: client interest in more effi-
cient and less costly legal services; advances in technology and telecommunications; 
globalization; and lack of lawyer accountability.).  
 230. See Neil Rose, Top Consumer Law Firm Targets Tie-Up with Big Brands 
After Receiving ABS License, LEGALFUTURES (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www. legalfu-
tures.co.uk/latest-news/exclusive-top-consumer-law-firm-targets-tie-up-big-brands-
receiving-abs-licence [hereinafter Rose, Top Consumer Law Firm]. 
 231. See MacEwen et al., supra note 51, at 84. 
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flexibility of the alternative business structure permits strategic partnering of 
attorneys with other professionals.
232
  As a result, law firms would have the 
ability to target a greater number of client types.
233
  Firms would be able to 
continue assisting those clients most in need, but could also cater to other 
client types with varied issues.
234
  
Existing and prospective clients and the general public would also reap 
the benefits of law firms adopting alternative business structures.  Today’s 
clients, irrespective of their classification or socio-economic statuses, often 
have legal needs that are inseparable from their other professional service 
needs.
235
  Investments in the working and human capital at a firm would ena-
ble the firm to address the multidisciplinary issues of their clients.  In turn, 
clients would find the alternative business structure appealing as a convenient 
one-stop shop that could offer a comprehensive solution to their legal and 
non-legal issues.  
2.  Cost of Capital and Pubic Demand Compel Law Firms to Increase 
Transparency Regardless of Their Governance Structure 
Proponents of law firms incorporating and adopting alternative business 
structures appreciate that limitations on governance structures need apply.  
For instance, increased access to capital and flexibility of funds would result 
in a need for greater transparency of law firms.
236
  The rationale is two-fold.  
The cost of capital (particularly public capital) includes a tangible social cost, 
one that manifests itself through the general public’s demand for transparen-
cy.
237
  Parties with vested interests in incorporated or alternative business 
  
 232. See Neil Rose, Focus: Alternative Business Structures – Law and New Or-
der, THE LAWYER (Nov. 6, 2011), http://www.thelawyer.com/news-and-analysis/the-
lawyer-management/abs-news-and-analysis/focus-alternative-business-structures-law-
and-new-order/1010138.article [hereinafter Rose, Alternative Business Structures] 
(Alternative business structures in the United Kingdom are recognized as purposeful 
entities that function as tools for law firms to employ strategically in building global 
and diverse practice rather than simply ends in themselves); see also Rose, Top Con-
sumer Law Firm, supra note 230. 
 233. See Rose, Alternative Business Structures, supra note 232. 
 234. See Hodge, supra note 54, at 92 (Law firms can afford taking on riskier cli-
ent types or contingency fee cases with high pay-off potential).  
 235. See Cliff Ennico, How to Hire an Attorney, ENTREPRENEUR, http://www. 
entrepreneur.com/article/58326-1 (last visited Aug. 19, 2013) (urging that every busi-
ness needs a lawyer to handle the intricacies of the law and further the ultimate suc-
cess of the business). 
 236. See generally Studer, supra note 94, at 1. 
 237. See SADOK EL GHOUL ET AL., DOES CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
AFFECT THE COST OF CAPITAL? 3-4 (July 2010), available at http://www.edwards. 
usask.ca/centres/csfm/_files/presentations/dev%20mishra.pdf (arguing that socially 
responsible companies have higher valuation and lower risk, creating incentives to 
demonstrate a commitment to socially beneficial practices). 
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structure law firms, such as investors, employees, and clients (existing and 
prospective), should be able to obtain general information on the firm.  
Here we suggest transparency of the firm financials, at a basic and unob-
trusive level.  Though law firms may cringe at the idea of increased transpar-
ency of their financials, they likely will be willing to pay the price in order to 
incorporate or adopt alternative business structures.  Experience shows that 
publicly-traded law firms in Australia and the United Kingdom are willing to 
make this sacrifice.
238
  The best means by which to achieve this financial 
transparency is through a disclosure requirement.  Consider the financial in-
dustry and the SEC’s mandatory disclosure requirements.
239
  In order to re-
spond to such criticisms and continue as a self-governing profession,
240
 law 
firms should be subject to disclosure requirements analogous to those im-
posed by the SEC,
241
 regardless of the firms’ governance structures.   
B.  There Should Be Mandatory Disclosure of Basic Financial  
Information for All Incorporated Law Firms and Other Law Firms 
Employing 100 or More Attorneys 
“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most ef-
ficient policeman.”
242
  Regardless of the applicability of securities laws to an 
incorporated law firm,
243
 any state that allows law firms to assume a corpo-
rate structure should require the disclosure of basic financial documentation.  
States, of course, would be perfectly free to set the terms of use for incorpo-
rated law firms, just as they are free (within the confines of federal preemp-
tion) to implement their own security “blue sky” laws.  Indeed, the benefits of 
this disclosure are significant enough that the disclosures should be required 
of all law firms with more than 100 lawyers, regardless of governance struc-
ture.  For too long the finances of large law firms have been sheltered from 
public view,
244
 avoiding the scrutiny of investors, employees, and prospective 
  
 238. See Lloyd, supra note 176.  
 239. See, e.g., SEC, FORM X-17A-5, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/ 
nasdaqllcf1a4_5/g_secform.pdf (last visited July 21, 2013) (requiring brokers and 
dealers to disclose basic financial information and an audited balance sheet on a  
quarterly basis). 
 240. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT PREAMBLE AND SCOPE 
COMMENT 10, supra note 200. 
 241. See generally SEC, FINANCIAL REPORTING MANUAL, available at 
http://www. sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cffinancialreportingmanual.shtml (last visited 
Aug. 19, 2013) (outlining SEC’s financial disclosure requirements). 
 242. LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (1914). 
 243. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 244. See Grand, supra note 89, at 391 (“The SEC requires national exchanges 
such as the NYSE and NASDAQ to de-list companies that do not comply with its 
disclosure and audit rules; law firms face no similar consequences.  And there is no 
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employees alike.
245
  Large law firms should be required to disclose financial 
information for both the good of the general public and the good of lawyers. 
A disclosure requirement would simply extend the normal requirements 
for a business to furnish books and records to its stakeholders, recognizing 
that the general public has a stake in the provision of legal services.  It would 
also be similar to the requirement that other professionals, such as broker-
dealers, furnish basic information to the public regarding the financial situa-
tion of their firms.
246
  A shareholder already has a limited right to inspect the 
books and records of a corporation.
247
  A partner has a similar right to access 
the books and records of the partnership, as well as information reasonably 
required to properly exercise the partner’s functions.
248
  These rights of ac-
cess mean that a mandatory disclosure regime would only expand the ability 
to find financial information beyond the direct owners of the partnership or 
corporation.  There is little reason not to provide freely to the public that 
which must already be furnished to the ownership of a firm.  The cost of dis-
tributing this information is not a concern, simply because it could be done 
electronically.
249
  Because the public has a similar interest to the partners in 
understanding and knowing the finances of a law firm, all firms of over 100 
lawyers should be required to make minimally-intrusive financial disclosures 
available to the public.  
1.  Disclosure Would Benefit Attorneys and Prospective Employees 
Attorneys should welcome the implementation of disclosure require-
ments for large law firms.  The current lack of information regarding internal 
firm finances can lead to the sudden and spectacular collapse of large law 
firms with hardly any notice.
250
  This sudden collapse is possible because of 
  
threat of a shareholder class action for breach of fiduciary duty to strike fear among 
law firm partnerships as it does among directors of public companies.”). 
 245. But see Cox, supra note 37, at 523 (“Hiring partners and recruiters have 
noticed that, in contrast to flush times when candidates are chiefly concerned about 
personal fit and compensation, they now ask ‘more specific questions about the   
financial history, equity levels, borrowing habits and financing plans of the firms they 
are considering.’”).  
 246. See, e.g., SEC, FORM X-17A-5, supra note 239. 
 247. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 220 (West, Westlaw through 79 Laws 
2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.461 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Regular Sess.). 
 248. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 403 (2012). 
 249. See Electronic Records Transition: What’s Your Status?, IRON MOUNTAIN, 
http://www.ironmountain.com/Knowledge-Center/Reference-Library/View-by-
Document-Type/General-Articles/E/Electronic-Records-Transition-Whats-Your-
Status.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2013) (asserting that using electronic records reduces 
costs, boosts efficiency, and decreases data error). 
 250. See, e.g., Linda Sandler & Sophia Pearson, After Dewey & LeBoeuf, It’s 
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the ability of a law firm to take on large amounts of debt in anticipation        
of expansion, while the firm’s rainmakers are not obligated to stay and keep 
their clients with the firm.
251
  The exit of major partners can deprive a firm of 
the revenues it had depended upon to pay the interest on debt, creating a  
sudden and catastrophic collapse.
252
  A minimum level of disclosure would 
help to prevent surprise collapses by warning employees about the amount   
of leverage a firm has taken on.  Employees would then be able to plan       
for the amount of risk that the firm’s finances presented, and minimize their 
exposure to loss.  Recent hires and prospective employees would not      
waste time considering a firm that they believed to be “too risky” for their 
personal tastes.  
Additionally, disclosure would have numerous benefits for firms that are 
not at risk.
253
  Disclosing firm finances would dispel rumors among employ-
ees that the situation is unstable, keeping partners and associates at the firm 
by easing fears of financial stress.
254
  This would help to alleviate the difficul-
ties of a transient workforce twice over.  Openness about the financial situa-
tion would show employees the reason for certain financial or compensation 
decisions, eliminating any “us versus them” mentalities and facilitating coop-
erative solutions.
255
  Disclosure regarding firm hiring and promotion practice 
accompanying firm financials could assist recruitment efforts by dispelling 
worries of sexism at the firm, or eliminate sexism – intentional or not – by 
shaming any firms with gender-disparate results.
256
  All in all, the majority of 
a law firm’s associates, potential associates, non-lawyer employees, and even 
many partners should enjoy the benefits of knowing the true financial       
situation of the firm.  
  
lawyers (“The firm, based in New York, fell apart in a matter of weeks this year after 
ousting its chairman and watching at least 250 of its 304 partners decamp to        
competing firms.”). 
 251. See Robert W. Hillman, Professional Partnerships, Competition, and the 
Evolution of Firm Culture: The Case of Law Firms, 26 J. CORP. L. 1061, 1067 (2001) 
(describing the ability of partners to move to new firms and take their clients with 
them, creating financial instability at the abandoned firm). 
 252. Although a firm will be able to insist on payment of a share of client fees for 
representation, which began at the firm, the exodus of partners will nonetheless de-
prive the firm of cash flows of future representation of that client.  See id. at 1069-74.  
This share of fees for future representation will often be far more valuable than the 
representation on the particular matter of representation when the partner departs.  Id. 
 253. See generally Studer, supra note 94, at 1.  
 254. Id. (“People assume the worst when they don’t hear from leaders.”). 
 255. Id. 
 256. See Grand, supra note 89, at 410-11 (describing how disclosure could reme-
dy gender discrimination in law firm hiring and promotions practices). 
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2.  Disclosure Would Benefit Clients and Prospective Clients 
Consider the collapse of a law firm from the client’s point of view.  A 
client has every incentive to avoid a firm teetering on the brink.  The client 
has selected a particular law firm for its competence in the field and invests a 
significant amount of time and money in obtaining legal assistance.  Upon 
collapse, the partners and associates assigned to represent this client may 
scatter to any number of different firms.
257
  If the client is lucky, one of the 
departing partners keeps the file; otherwise, it is time to find new counsel.
258
  
The client could potentially end up paying to replicate large portions of the 
representation, including basic review of the file.  Worse, during a bankruptcy 
regulators may wish to inspect a firm’s documents, including files that may 
be confidential and privileged.  Hearings would be required to explain why 
such documents are covered by attorney-client privilege, and this becomes 
more complicated when counsel is no longer in the business.
259
  The client’s 
entire case could end up delayed as a result of the legal team representing it 
being shattered.
260
  This is a nightmare for a client to face.  A client would 
therefore have every incentive to check firm finances and avoid firms that 
present a substantial risk of collapse, unless it could obtain a discount on legal 
fees proportionate to the risk.  This risk premium would provide another in-
centive to law firms to avoid over leveraging.  
3.  Disclosure of Firm Finances Would Benefit Shareholders  
and Creditors 
The general public – including creditors and any potential share-     
holders – could benefit from the disclosure of some amount of financial in-
  
 257. See, e.g., Martin Coyle & Julie DiMauro, Dewey & LeBoeuf Collapse High-
lights Importance to Clients of Safeguarding Records, REUTERS (June 1, 2012), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2012/06/01/dewey- leboeuf-
collapse-highlights-importance-to-clients-of-safeguarding-records/ (“Records for 
clients of attorneys moving to other firms would be transferred, as in the case of any 
lateral transfer.  The issue of records pertaining to clients not associated with any 
departed attorneys is more problematic, because the firm has an obligation to notify 
such clients and arrange for the proper disposition of the records.”). 
 258. Id. 
 259. See id. (“[A] judge might need an explanation as to why a document was 
covered by the privilege badge.  A firm and its lawyer might need to explain this       
in court.”). 
 260. See Nate Raymond & Jessica Dye, Fallout from Dewey Collapse Hits Cli-
ents, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (May 28, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-05-
28/news/sns-rt-us-dewey-clientsbre84r0lc-20120528_1_clients-firm-winston-strawn 
(describing a sixty-day reprieve granted to the Arab Bank Group, a defendant      
represented by Dewey & LeBoeuf lawyers, because its defense team was “decimated” 
by the bankruptcy). 
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formation from large law firms.  Currently, public perceptions and creditors’ 
views of firms are shaped by the limited information provided by law firms, 
leading to an extreme emphasis on profits-per-partner rather than firm finance 
as a whole.
261
  These metrics are easily manipulated by firms that seek to 
bolster appearances simply by creating more “non-equity partners” and de-
creasing equity partners, or by cutting out low revenue or pro bono ser-
vices.
262
  Law firms focusing on these numbers have strong incentives to sac-
rifice long-term stability for short-term gains in purely money-driven metrics.  
By contrast, a law firm providing a more detailed picture of its finances 
would be less likely to be able to hide untoward details from the public be-
hind a favorable profit-per-partner number.  Sunlight, as Louis Brandeis sug-
gested, would prove a powerful disinfectant for a law firm focusing too 
strongly on bottom-line numbers.  The general public, be they creditors, po-
tential shareholders, stakeholders, or clients, would all be able to form a more 
accurate understanding of a firm’s position in society if the firm were re-
quired to disclose financial information to the public. 
4.  Disclosure Is Compatible with Ethical and Legal Confidentiality 
Requirements 
Opponents of law firm incorporation have argued that the confidentiality 
requirements of the attorney-client relationship are incompatible with the 
mandatory disclosure required by the SEC and state securities laws.
263
  In 
essence, the argument goes as follows: first, a lawyer has an obligation to 
maintain the confidentiality of his clients’ matters.
264
  Second, either a man-
datory disclosure regime – such as that required by securities laws – or a fi-
nancial disclosure system could require a firm to disclose when new clients 
opt to retain its services but before the clients are ready to make a public an-
nouncement.
265
  One particularly acute example of this would be if a firm 
specializing in mergers and acquisitions had been hired in confidence by a 
large corporation to consider a possible acquisition.  Such an event could be 
considered material information required to be disclosed in a financial report, 
but disclosure would run contrary to the client’s justified need for discretion 
  
 261. See Petzold, supra note 56, at 89; MacEwen et al., supra note 51, at 72-73 
(indicating profits per equity partner and revenue per lawyer receive the most empha-
sis and affect firm behavior the most of any metric). 
 262. See MacEwen et al., supra note 51, at 76. 
 263. See, e.g., Hodge, supra note 54, at 93; Steve Mark, Views from an Australian 
Regulator, 2009 J. PROF. LAW. 45, 56-58 (2009).  
 264. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2012). 
 265. For example, if a firm retains a client with a substantial up-front fee shortly 
before publishing its annual 10-K report or the mandatory reporting proposed herein, 
skeptics argue that it would be required to disclose information regarding the source 
of these funds in breach of client confidences.  
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lest stock prices of its potential targets rise prematurely.  However, this con-
cern for inconsistent obligations is overblown.  
First, there may not actually be a contradiction between mandatory dis-
closure and client confidences.  Generally speaking, the securities laws and 
disclosure regimes only require reports on material information, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court has defined this as information which would have a “substan-
tial likelihood” to be “viewed by the reasonable investor as having signifi-
cantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”
266
  It is reasona-
ble to wonder when the exact identity of a party might ever be capable of 
significantly altering the total mix of information available to an investor.  
Surely the only “material” information to an investor would be the amount of 
money and the certainty of payment, without need for specific information 
that could breach client confidences.  Indeed, in crafting a new mandatory 
disclosure regime states could carve out an exception stating that any infor-
mation that personally identifies a client would not be deemed material.
267
 
Second, we can turn to the experience of Australia and its publicly-
traded law firms for guidance about how to handle potential conflicts.  Slater 
& Gordon are subject to reporting requirements, which include a continuous 
disclosure requirement for information that could have a material effect on 
stock valuation.
268
  The Australian authorities found a simple yet elegant  
solution: simply require disclosure up-front in the prospectus and state that 
the duties to the client would trump the duties to the shareholder in cases      
of conflict.
269
  Placing shareholders on notice that the firm will not breach 
client confidences should it face a contradiction like this serves to even    
further remove the information regarding client identity from materiality  
because shareholders will be able to discount their purchase price to account 
for this risk.  
Finally, the SEC already allows for requests for confidential treatment 
of information that would otherwise be disclosed.
270
  These confidential 
treatment requests are available for reasons that parallel the exemptions under 
the Freedom of Information Act.
271
  The most pertinent of these exceptions 
  
 266. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
 267. See Cobb, supra note 123, at 774-75 (suggesting, for example, that either a 
regulatory carve-out for certain information or even confidentiality agreements for 
nonlawyer managers could successfully keep confidential client information private).  
 268. See generally Steve Mark, supra note 263, at 56-58 (describing Australian 
reporting requirements). 
 269. See id. at 58 (“the evident tension in duties may be resolved through careful 
drafting of the corporation's prospectus, constituent documents and shareholder 
agreements . . . ”). 
 270. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 200.80, 230.406, 240.24b-2 (2013); SEC, Confidential 
Treatment Requests, SEC.GOV (July 11, 2001), http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/ 
slbcf1r.htm. 
 271. 5 U.S.C.§ 552(b) (2012) (exempting from public disclosure matters covered 
by statutes either without discretion or according to particular criteria). 
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are for trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial information, 
and for information specifically exempted from disclosure by statute.
272
  Even 
if confidential client information were otherwise subject to disclosure under 
the securities laws or an expanded disclosure regime, a similar exemption for 
confidential treatment of the most sensitive information should take prece-
dence over the needs for disclosure.  All in all, there is no reason to suspect 
that the obligation of confidentiality is actually in tension with reasonable 
disclosure requirements in practice because of materiality limitations and 
confidentiality exceptions. 
5.  Disclosure for All Firms of More Than 100 Lawyers 
For the foregoing reasons, basic disclosure is essential for all firms of 
more than 100 lawyers, regardless of whether these firms choose to incorpo-
rate.  The disclosure for these firms does not need to be as extensive as the 
disclosure for compliance with securities regulations; instead, this disclosure 
regime could be modeled around the requirements for other professionals.  
One example of this less extensive disclosure regime is the requirement of 
broker-dealers to submit quarterly Financial and Operational Combined Uni-
form Single Reports, as required under Exchange Act Rule 17a-5.
273
  This 
report does not rise to the level of other SEC documents, such as registration 
statements, but is nonetheless sufficient for a potential customer to infer the 
financial solvency of the broker-dealer and to guard against some risky finan-
cial decision-making by the broker.  This information should be required of 
legal professionals for similar reasons it is required of brokers: because sun-
light is the best disinfectant for unsound financial practices.  
The basic mandatory reporting required of law firms of more than 100 
lawyers would not present any significant confidentiality concerns.  The re-
porting would be restricted to a basic balance sheet and income statement, 
omitting any client-specific details that could jeopardize confidentiality.  The 
required information would simply relate to solvency of the firm: assets, lia-
bilities, income, and expenses, broken down into constituent but not client-
specific categories.  The disclosure of this information would permit current 
and prospective employees and clients, as well as potential creditors, to judge 
the financial solvency of the firm before making any decisions regarding rep-
resentation or investment.  The result would likely be a more efficient market 
for legal representation and employment by large law firms, and a cleansing 
of debt-heavy balance sheets due to unfavorable market reaction to unsound 
financial strategies.  
  
 272. Id. § 552(b)(3)-(4). 
 273. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5 (2013) (requiring the filing of audited 
financial statements and the information required on related SEC forms, as well        
as delivery to customers that request the information); SEC, FORM X-17A-5, supra 
note 239. 
41
Adams: Adams: Rethinking the Law Firm
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: Adams – Final Formatting – 1/23/14 Created on:  2/17/2014 3:36:00 PM Last Printed: 2/17/2014 3:38:00 PM 
818 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78   
The legal profession has largely remained a self-regulating industry.  
Other self-regulating industries have recognized the importance of financial 
disclosure to the maintenance of professional standards.
274
  By requiring the 
legal profession to engage in the same disclosure that the legal profession 
expects of others, we could raise the ethical standards of lawyers and ensure 
the financial security of large law firms in the future.  This would benefit 
lawyers, their clients, and the law firms themselves moving forward.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Introducing the corporate form to U.S. law firms is a step overdue.  The 
potential benefits of this structure – increased efficiency and innovation, 
which would increase access to higher quality legal services – far outweigh 
the speculative sacrifices to professional ethics.  Increased transparency and 
mandatory financial disclosure will end the practice of obscuring law firm 
performance in misleading financial information.  Clients deserve better, and 
if U.S. firms want to remain competitive in the market for global legal ser-
vices they must have access to more flexible business structures.  The notion 
of the law firm as an entity distinct from a business is dying.  Other countries 
are recognizing that fact and are implementing changes that will disadvantage 
U.S. firms.  The writing was on the wall for bloated firms saddled with debt 
when the 2008 recession hit.  The time has come to change course and treat 
law firms as the global enterprises they have become.  
 
  
 274. For example, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) acts as 
the self-regulatory organization for securities firms and provides regulation and over-
sight to brokerages.  Among other services, FINRA uses disclosure as a mechanism to 
protect investors.   
FINRA believes that investor education is a critical component of investor 
protection.  Over the last decade, we have worked hard to develop a strong in-
vestor education outreach program.  We produce alerts, interactive tools and 
educational content to help investors make wise financial decisions.  Our Bro-
kerCheck tool, for example, provides investors with a quick way to check a 
broker's disciplinary and professional background.  Encouraging people to 
take this simple step before doing business – or continuing to do business – 
with a broker is part of our greater commitment to protecting investors.  
Richard G. Ketchum, Chairman’s Message, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ 
AboutFINRA/ (last visited July 21, 2013). 
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